Trinity theories versus Scripture

    Since around AD 381, mainstream Christians have historically insisted that a belief in ‘the Trinity’ is required for salvation, or that it is at the very least a central doctrine of Christianity. The problem with this, however, is that there is no ‘doctrine of the Trinity.’ On the contrary, there are many different ways that the traditional language of “one God in/as three Persons,” or “one essence and three subsistences,” has been interpreted by Christians, most of which are inconsistent with one another. These different Trinity theories are catalogued by philosopher Dale Tuggy in this article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In this post, I will give a short summary of each Trinity theory and analyze it using both logic and the teaching of Scripture.

    The axioms of ‘orthodox trinitarianism’

Before actually discussing each Trinity theory, let’s examine the axioms that any Trinity theory must incorporate in order to be ‘orthodox.’ There are six such axioms:

1. There is exactly one god — one supreme divine being.
2. This one god is referred to as “God” or “the LORD” or “Yahweh.”
3. The Father is God, the LORD.
4. The Son is God, the LORD.
5. The Holy Spirit is God, the LORD.
6. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each distinct from the other two. [1]

These are the elements necessary for any minimally orthodox Trinity theory (ignoring claims about eternal generation and procession). Although these six claims are often presented as the ‘doctrine of the Trinity,’ mostly by trinitarian Christian apologists, these claims do not by themselves constitute a doctrine. There are many ways in which they can be, and have been, interpreted, as you can see below.

    One-self Trinity theories

According to Tuggy, “A self is [an entity] who is in principle capable of knowledge, intentional action, and interpersonal relationships.” One human person would be a single self, even if he had multiple personality disorder, because the other personalities within his head would be unable to access knowledge that the person himself did not know (at least subconsciously), and would be unable to have true interpersonal relationships with one another. Different selves, such as multiple human persons, can have knowledge apart from one another, and have truly interpersonal relationships with one another.

    One-self Trinity theories postulate that God is a single great self. According to such theories, the “Persons” within the Trinity are not persons according to the modern sense (selves), but persons in the ancient sense of the word, that is, modes of being in which God eternally and essentially lives. The three Persons can appear to interact with one another at the same time, but are merely different ways that God ‘play-acts’ with Himself. [2] Tuggy quotes several statements from modern one-self trinitarians:

As God is in Himself Father from all eternity, He begets Himself as the Son from all eternity. As He is the Son from all eternity, He is begotten of Himself as the Father from all eternity. In this eternal begetting of Himself and being begotten of Himself, He posits Himself a third time as the Holy Spirit, that is, as the love which unites Him in Himself. [3]

[God] is — at once and necessarily — the unoriginate who mediates himself to himself (Father), the one who is in truth uttered for himself (Son), and the one who is received and accepted in love for himself (Spirit) — and... as a result of this, he [God] is the one who can freely communicate himself. [4]

...when we talk about God as one person, we mean one person in the modern sense of the word [i.e., a self], and when we talk about God as three persons, we mean three persons in the ancient sense of the word [i.e., a persona or role that is played]. [5]

According to these theories, the one god is one self who eternally and necessarily acts as three different Persons; these Persons are not selves, but essential personas of a single self. This type of Trinity theory has been common in Western Christianity since Augustine of Hippo, and was propounded by influential theologians Barth and Rahner in the twentieth century.

    One-self Trinity theories have some difficulty coherently interpreting the six axioms of trinitarianism. Yes, there is one god in the sense that there is one self. But if we say that the single self is God, then the Persons, the modes of being in which God acts, are not by themselves God. Whereas, if we define each mode as being a god named “God” and “Yahweh,” this simply makes three gods named “Yahweh.” Perhaps the best way to resolve this dilemma is simply to say that each mode just is the single self, in the same way that I might have two modes, “happy Andrew” and “angry Andrew,” but they are both still identical to myself.

    The characterization of God as a single great self is well-motivated by Scripture, which constantly depicts God using singular pronouns, having knowledge, and having interpersonal relationships with others. Whenever the uniqueness of God is described, in over a dozen passages, singular personal pronouns like “I,” “Thou,” and “He” are used: Deut. 4:35, 39; 32:39; 2 Sam. 7:22; 2 Kgs. 19:15; 1 Chron. 17:20; Neh. 9:6; Psa. 86:10; Isa. 43:10, 11; 44:6-8; 45:5, 21; 46:9; Hos. 13:4; Joel 2:27; and Mark 12:32-34. In addition, one-self theories of the Trinity take seriously the biblical claim that the Father just is the one true god (John 5:43, 44; 17:3; 1 Cor. 8:4-6; Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 1:17).

    Nonetheless, one-self Trinity theories fail when they are compared against other aspects of Scripture. The Father and the Son are depicted in the New Testament as having interpersonal relationships with one another, as the Son prays to the Father (Matt. 11:25, 26; Mark 14:36; 15:34; Luke 5:16; 23:34, 46; John 11:41, 42; 12:27, 28; 17); worships and loves the Father (Matt. 4:8-10; Mark 12:29, 30; John 14:31); is loved by the Father (Mark 1:11; 9:7; John 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 17:24; Eph. 1:6); obeys the Father (John 5:30; 6:38; 14:31; 15:10; Phil. 2:5-8; Heb. 5:8-9); and mediates the relationship between the Father and humans (Rom. 8:34; 1 Tim. 2:5; Heb. 9:15). Furthermore, the Son has different knowledge than the Father (Mark 13:32). According to Scripture, then, the Father and the Son are separate selves by definition.

    In addition, God and the Son have differed at the same time (or eternally). The Son has a Father, but God has no father. Jesus died, but God is undying (1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16). God sent Jesus, and Jesus was sent by God (John 8:42; 17:3). Given one-self Trinity theory, God is triune or trimodal, but the Son is not trimodal. It’s self-evident that nothing can (at one time or eternally) differ from itself; we employ this type of reasoning all the time in our daily lives. Since the Son differs from God, the Son cannot be identical to God or a mere mode of God. Consequently, one-self Trinity theories are not compatible with Scripture.

    Three-self Trinity theories

In contrast to one-self Trinity theories, many Christian philosophers and lay people instead hold to a three-self view of the Trinity. On this view, rather than God being a single self, each of the three Persons is a self, who together make up (in some way) the one god.

    Social Trinitarianism

According to social trinitarianism, the divine essence is a universal — that is, a set of properties belonging to God alone — while the Persons are particulars or instances of the divine universal. One ancient social trinitarian, Basil of Caesarea, said that the relation between the essence and the Persons is like the relationship between the essence, ‘humanity,’ and three instances of humanity, such as Peter, Paul, and John (Ep. 38). The views of modern social trinitarians are the same:

God the Trinity is constituted by three persons (in Boethius’ sense of ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’) who have a common divine essence, and are individuated only by their relations to each other. Having that essence entail[s] each being omnipotent and so perfectly good. [6]

On this view, the three Persons are each selves who exist in eternal harmony and loving relationship. Social trinitarianism has traditionally been popular in Eastern Christianity, beginning with the ‘Cappadocian Fathers’ of the fourth century; however, today it is becoming more popular in the West, especially among analytic theologians like Richard Swinburne.

    It’s unclear whether social trinitarianism manages to interpret the six axioms of trinitarianism in a logically coherent fashion. One difficulty is that concrete instances of universals are entities in their own right; for example, three concrete instances of ‘humanity’ would be three humans. Therefore, three concrete instances of the divine universal would be three gods. Swinburne attempts to resolve this dilemma by saying that both the divine essence and the Persons can be called “God;” since there is only one divine essence, in this sense there is only one god. [7] But this merely papers over the problem, because on this view there are four “Gods” — entities which can be called “God” — and three gods — instances of the divine essence. Thus, social trinitarianism seems to be incompatible with monotheism.

    Does this type of three-self trinitarianism cohere with Scripture? In some ways, it coheres better than one-self Trinity theories. Three-self trinitarianism makes sense of the interpersonal relationship between the Father and the Son, and the difference in knowledge between the Father and the Son. Furthermore, it can make sense of the differences between Jesus and God, because the Son is not identical to “God” (i.e., the divine essence), but is one-third of the divine essence. On three-self Trinity theories, it is possible for Jesus to have died, even though God is undying, because the divine essence did not die when the Son died — it continued to be instantiated in the Father and the Holy Spirit.

    However, in other ways, three-self trinitarianism fails to account for the Scriptural evidence. God is consistently presented as a single great self, who uses singular pronouns thousands of times. When describing His uniqueness, God says,

I am the LORD, and there is no other beside Me. I will strengthen you even though you do not know Me, that they may know from the rising of the sun to its setting that there is none beside Me. I am the LORD, and there is no other. (Isa. 45:5-6)

Singular pronouns are also used in over a dozen other places to describe God’s uniqueness (see above). The God of the Bible is not a ‘what,’ but a single, unique self. For God to be multiple selves, and yet talk about Themselves as a single self, would be divine deception. [8]

    Furthermore, according to multiple places in the New Testament, the Father is the only god, or “the one God” (John 5:43, 44; 17:3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 1:17). But if three-self trinitarianism is true, then the Father is not the only god, because He is neither the divine essence, of which He is only one-third, nor the only instance of the divine essence, of which He is one of three. Consequently, any logically coherent three-self Trinity theory is simply incompatible with the testimony of Scripture, both the Old Testament and the New Testament.

    Trinity Monotheism

A more modern three-self Trinity theory is Trinity monotheism, which is the view that God just is the Trinity, because one of the divine properties is being triune. In contrast to social trinitarianism, which considers each of the Persons to be an instance of the divine essence, Trinity monotheism considers the Trinity to be the only instance of the divine essence. Here are some quotes from Trinity monotheists:

The persons of the Trinity are not divine in virtue of instantiating the divine nature. For presumably being triune is a property of the divine nature (God does not just happen to be triune); yet the persons of the Trinity do not have that property. It now becomes clear that the reason that the Trinity is not a fourth instance of the divine nature is that there are no other instances of the divine nature. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not instances of the divine nature, and that is why there are not three Gods. The Trinity is the sole instance of the divine nature, and therefore there is but one God. [9]

According to the doctrine of the Trinity [sic] there are three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each of whom is fully divine, fully God. There is, furthermore, a single concrete divine nature—a single trope or instance of Godhood—that is the nature of each of the three Persons... The divine essentia, in other words, consists of a single trope of Godhood or divinity. [10]

The primary modern proponents of this view, J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, suggest that God is a single soul which possesses three complete sets of cognitive faculties, or ‘centers of consciousness.’ [11]

    Ignoring whether this concept is possible and whether three sets of rational faculties would count as three selves, does Trinity monotheism adhere to the axioms of trinitarianism? Not at all. Certainly, on this view, there is only one god, God the Trinity. But because the Trinity alone is God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not God. Moreland and Craig embrace this implication of their theory, saying that the three Persons are divine in a different and lesser sense than the Trinity; they admit that this is not the ‘orthodox’ view, but claim that it is nevertheless consistent with Scripture. [12]

    But is Trinity monotheism consistent with Scripture? Unfortunately, no. Like social trinitarianism, this theory fails to make sense of the more than a dozen instances in which God’s absolute singularity is described using singular pronouns (see above). If God were a composite of three selves, then They would use plural pronouns when describing Their uniqueness, not singular pronouns. Furthermore, the New Testament states that the only god is the Father (John 5:43, 44; 17:3; 1 Cor. 8:4-6; Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 1:17); under Trinity monotheism, the only god is the Trinity, not the Father. Thus, in addition to its failure to be ‘orthodox,’ Trinity monotheism is inconsistent with the testimony of Scripture.

    Four-self Trinity theory

Chad McIntosh has recently proposed a new Trinity theory, which aims to solve the Scriptural and logical problems of other three-self Trinity theories. According to this theory, the three Persons are three selves, but the Trinity as a whole is also a ‘corporate’ self. [13] McIntosh appeals to the biblical idea of ‘corporate personality,’ in which multiple individuals are, by virtue of their unified action, considered together as one self (e.g., Dan. 7:13, 14, 27; Mark 5:6ff; Rom. 12:5; 1 Cor. 12:12). [14] Therefore, God is really four divine Persons: three “intrinsicist persons” and one “functional person.”

    If the names “God” and “Yahweh” can refer either to the corporate Self or the three Persons, then this theory makes sense of the axioms of trinitarianism. There is one god, God, the corporate Self; the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each God and are three selves; and each One is distinct from the other two. Furthermore, in some ways, it makes sense of Scripture. Because God is a single corporate self, He can use singular pronouns and engage in interpersonal relationships; yet because the Father and the Son are separate selves, They can have interpersonal relationships with each other.

    However, in other ways, this theory fails to cohere with the testimony of Scripture. It’s questionable whether corporate personality exists in the Bible to the extent that four-self Trinity theory requires. Yes, multiple individuals can be “one” (John 17:21, 22; Gal. 3:28), but such group entities never speak as a single self. In one of the examples that McIntosh gives, the group entity actually uses plural pronouns (“we;” Mark 5:10). Yet God uses singular pronouns in the Bible almost without exception, including when describing His uniqueness. This would still be divine deception, although perhaps to a lesser degree than on other three-self Trinity theories.

    Furthermore, four-self Trinity theory fails to make sense of the New Testament assertion that the Father is the one and only god (John 5:43, 44; 17:3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 1:17). According to this theory, the Father is neither the one “functional person,” of which He is only a part, nor the only “intrinsicist person.” Instead, the Father is merely one of three intrinsicist Persons who together comprise the one functional Person. Thus, four-self Trinity theory is no better than any other three-self Trinity theory when it comes to its consistency with the testimony of Scripture.

    Relative identity theory

There are a few trinitarians who believe in three selves within God, but don’t follow any of the theories laid out above, because of their conceptual difficulties. Instead, they argue that the concept of identity is itself flawed, and we should instead accept relative identity theory. This theory states that claims of numerical identity are unintelligible, and we can only use claims of relative identity (e.g., “X and Y are the same F,” but not “X is identical to Y”). For example, we cannot say that Paul just is Saul, but we can say that Paul and Saul are the same human or the same apostle. Therefore, it’s possible to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same god, but not the same self, without being contradictory; They are “God-identical but Person-distinct.” [15]

    This theory is compatible with the six axioms of trinitarianism. There is one god, God; the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each God, because all three are the same god; and each One is distinct from the other two. Furthermore, this theory is (for the most part) compatible with Scripture. It accepts that the Father is the only god (John 5:43, 44; 17:3; 1 Tim. 1:17), because the Son and Holy Spirit are the same god; but it is also compatible with the fact that the Father and the Son have an interpersonal relationship, because They are different selves. The theory runs into some trouble with the Bible’s depiction of God as a unique self, but this can be explained away by the fact that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are “God-identical.”

    However, the problem with relative identity theory is that it is obviously logically inconsistent. It is a self-evident truth that, if X and Y are the same F, then X and Y just are one and the same. For example, the claim that “Paul and Saul are the same apostle” means that Paul is an apostle, Saul is an apostle, and Paul and Saul are one and the same. So then, it is simply not possible for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be the same god and different selves:

1. For any X and Y, if X and Y are the same F, then X and Y are numerically identical.
2. The Father and the Son are the same god.
3. Therefore, the Father and the Son are numerically identical. (from 1, 2)
4. Therefore, the Father and the Son are the same self. (from 3)

Relative identity theorists would object to this argument, because they argue that numerical identity is unintelligible. But is this really true? Is the claim that “Paul just is Saul,” or “Yahweh just is God,” really impossible to understand? Virtually all philosophers and lay people would say “no.” Furthermore, relative identity theory seems to contradict the axiom of trinitarianism which says that the one god is “God” and “the LORD.” If there is no concept of absolute identity, then it is false that the LORD just is the one god and vice versa. Therefore, although relative identity theory may be more compatible with Scripture than other Trinity theories, it’s not logically coherent.

    Mysterianism

Some trinitarians, rather than committing to any one of the Trinity theories that have been proposed, simply say that the Trinity is an unintelligible “mystery.” Mysterians typically fall into two categories: negative mysterians, who claim that the axioms of trinitarianism are impossible to interpret in an orthodox way, and positive mysterians, who claim that the Trinity is apparently contradictory. Nonetheless, they continue to believe in the Trinity because they believe it has been divinely revealed (whether in Scripture or by Church councils). Some early pro-Nicene Christians were mysterians, such as Gregory Nazianzen, and many trinitarian Christians still are today.

    Positive mysterians may have a point about orthodox trinitarianism being apparently contradictory. The Athanasian Creed, an anonymous fifth-century work which is considered to be the standard of orthodox trinitarianism by Catholics and even many Protestant churches, states that “we are compelled by Christian truth to acknowledge each Person to be by himself God and Lord,” and yet it also says that “we are forbidden by catholic religion to say that there are three gods or three lords.” This logically collapses into a claim of numerical identity — the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit just is the same god, self, person, etc. But we are also told not to “conflate the Persons.”

    So the Athanasian Creed declares that, in order to be saved, one must believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are and are not numerically identical. This is a clear apparent contradiction. The same confusion appears in other trinitarian declarations of faith, such as those of the Eleventh Council of Toledo (675) and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). Fortunately, Eastern Orthodox and Protestants are free to disagree with these trinitarian statements of faith, while remaining within the orthodoxy of their own tradition; but the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity appears to be contradictory.

    Is mysterianism an adequate solution to the logical problem of the Trinity, from a Scriptural perspective? No, it’s not; the term “mystery” (Gk: musterion) in Scripture refers to something which has been made known, quite the opposite of something which continues to be unintelligible or contradictory. [16] Furthermore, although there are certainly things about God which cannot be fully known, that which has been divinely revealed is supposed to be intelligible to humans (Deut. 29:29). Why would God require us to believe a doctrine that quite literally cannot be understood, in order to be saved? This is not compatible with the Scriptural depiction of God as a loving god who wants all to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, mysterianism also fails to be a Scripturally sound theory of the Trinity.

    Conclusion

There are several important takeaways from this survey of Trinity theories. First, the mainstream catholic narrative about trinitarianism is false. It’s not true that the Trinity has been universally believed by Christians, because there’s no such thing as ‘the’ Trinity. Rather than there being just one ‘doctrine of the Trinity,’ there are many interpretations of creedal trinitarian language, none of which have ever enjoyed universal support among Christians (although lay Christians tend to assume that their particular interpretation is ‘the’ Trinity). This is largely due to the fact that, when trinitarianism was first enforced as orthodoxy in AD 381, there was no widespread agreement on what it meant. The language of “one God in three persons” is merely a shibboleth of mainstream catholic tradition.

    Second, it is not true that ‘the’ Trinity is inherently contradictory, as some unitarians have claimed, because (again) there’s no such thing. There are many different interpretations of trinitarianism, and most are logically coherent, although some Trinity theories — e.g., relative identity theory and positive mysterianism — do assert or imply apparent contradictions. Nor is it true that the Trinity is polytheistic; in fact, monotheism is one of the axioms of ‘orthodox trinitarianism.’ Nonetheless, some Trinity theories — such as social trinitarianism — do also imply polytheism, so they’re inconsistently monotheistic (that is, they assert one god and three gods).

    Finally, and most importantly, none of the Trinity theories that have been put forth so far are consistent with logic and/or the testimony of Scripture, even when the axioms of trinitarianism are taken for granted. One-self Trinity theories go against the interpersonal relationship between the Father and the Son, while three-self Trinity theories contradict the clear Scriptural teaching that God is a uniquely great self. Meanwhile, relative identity theory and mysterianism contradict the simple logical concept of numerical identity. Although these theories might not exhaust all possible interpretations of trinitarianism, trinitarians must come up with an interpretation of “one God in three persons” which does not contradict Scripture or basic logic. Otherwise, unitarians will be seriously disinclined to believe it.

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[1] https://www.blueletterbible.org/Comm/bowman_robert/trinity/trinity.cfm

[2] This is different from Sabellian modalism, which postulates that the three Persons do not exist eternally, but that God exists sequentially, in time, as these different Persons. Perhaps He lived in Old Testament times as the Father, then ‘begat’ Himself as a human being to become the Son, and finally became the Holy Spirit to live within believers. This is different from one-self Trinity theories, which instead postulate that the three modes (Persons) are eternal and essential to God.

This non-trinitarian theology appears to be entirely ruled out by passages in which the Father and Son are seen to be interacting with one another simultaneously (see esp. Matt. 3:16-17). Nonetheless, it remains somewhat popular among lay Christians, usually those who are more biblically illiterate. Some more sophisticated modalists argue that Jesus, “the Son,” is actually the human mind which was united to the divine Person of “the Father.” Therefore, when Jesus was interacting with the Father, he was interacting with Himself, that is, interacting with the divine Person to which he was united.

[3] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Volume I: The Doctrine of the Word of God, transl. G. T. Thomson, H. Knight, G. W. Bromiley, and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956): 1.

[4] Karl Rahner, The Trinity, transl. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1997): 101-102.

[5] Alistair McGrath, Understanding the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: 1988): 131.

[6] Richard Swinburne, “The social theory of the Trinity,” Religious Studies 54 (2018): 419.

[7] Ibid., 425.

[8] Dale Tuggy, “Divine Deception and Monotheism,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 186-209.

[9] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003): 590.

[10] William Hasker, “The One Divine Nature,” TheoLogica 3, no. 2 (2019): 57, 59.

[11] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 594.

[12] Ibid., 590-593.

[13] Chad A. McIntosh, “The God of the groups,” Religious Studies 52, no. 2 (2016): 167-186.

[14] Ibid., 177-181.

[15] Michael C. Rea, “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Philosophia Christi 5, no. 2 (2005): 432.

[16] Mark 4:11; Rom. 11:25; 16:25; 1 Cor. 2:7, 10; 15:51; Eph. 1:9; 3:3; 6:19; Col. 1:26, 27; 4:3; 1 Tim. 3:16.