Can free will exist?

    Few doctrines in Christianity have been more debated — or more taken for granted — than that of free will. For many Christians, the idea of free will underpins their entire belief system. If there’s no free will, how is it possible for one to freely accept or reject the gospel message? And how can anyone be considered truly morally accountable for their sins if free will doesn’t exist? It wouldn’t be an overstatement to say that without free will, the entire worldview of most Christians would collapse, because they see free will as the only way to explain the supposedly biblical position that many people will, ultimately, never be saved.

    Christians have traditionally understood the interplay between free will and God’s sovereignty in one of two ways. First, most Christians have believed that humans do, indeed, have free will, and yet God somehow also foreknows the future with perfect certainty (despite the fact that these two beliefs are seemingly logically contradictory) — this position is today known as Arminianism. Second, a minority since the Reformation have believed that free will does not exist in the normal sense of the word, but that God is intimately involved in every aspect of reality and human choice (despite the fact that this means that God predestines most people to eternal torment arbitrarily) — this position is known as Calvinism, or Reformed theology. There is also a third position, known as open theism, which argues that humans have free will and God does not know the future, but this position is avoided by most Christians.

    So, which of these views is correct? Does free will even exist, or is it an illusion? I believe that both of these questions boil down to a more fundamental issue: can free will exist? That is, is the libertarian sense of free will in which our decisions are not determined, and are the result of our own volition, logically possible? Because the doctrine of free will is so important in Christianity, and has such a great effect on the debate surrounding universalism, in this post we will explore this question of whether free will can exist in reality.

    Defining our terms

One of the biggest problems in the debate surrounding free will is how the terms are defined. People are extremely prone to confusing the idea of choice, or agency, with the idea of libertarian free will. No one doubts that humans have the ability to choose, of course; we go through conscious and subconscious choices every second. The question is whether the outcomes of our choices are ultimately based on our own volition, or if they’re determined by outside forces. Here are the definitions of each of the terms to be used in this article:

Will/Agency: the ability to decide between two or more options at any given time

Choice: the act of using one’s will or agency to decide between two or more options

Decision: the outcome of a choice

Libertarian Free Will: the idea that our decisions are the result of our own volition and not determined by outside forces

Compatibilist Free Will: the idea that our decisions are determined by outside forces, but are free in the sense that the decision comes from within the agent [1]

From here on, we’ll simply refer to libertarian free will as “free will”, since this is the theory of will which people think of when they refer to free will. Now that we have defined our terms, we can begin examining whether (libertarian) free will is logically possible.

    Are our actions caused or uncaused... or is this even relevant?

Determinists (including compatibilists) see our decisions as something like the roll of a die. To understand this theory of will, it is best to think of our decisions in terms of outputs and inputs. The output of the roll of a die is seemingly random and changeable, but ultimately it is fully the result of certain inputs combined with the laws of physics. Those inputs are themselves outputs resulting from earlier inputs, and so on. Likewise, determinists see decision as completely the result of previous events.

    For example, if I choose at a certain time to drink coffee rather than water, that output is ultimately the result of previous inputs, such as my preference for coffee over water, my hunger level at the time of the decision, the temperature of the room, etc. And each of those are based on even earlier inputs; why was my hunger level what it was at the time? Perhaps because of causes outside of my own control, or perhaps because of another past decision that I made which was, itself, the output of other inputs. But ultimately, what determinists believe is that if the circumstances at the time and all past events were known perfectly, my decision could be predicted with perfect accuracy.

    It should be obvious why this view is incompatible with (libertarian) free will. If our decisions can be predicted with perfect accuracy beforehand, and they are ultimately the result of events outside of our own control, then they can’t be the result of our own volition to any degree. Because of this, those who believe in free will often present the issue as a dichotomy between determinism and free will: if our decisions are not entirely governed by past events, then they can be the result of our own volition, at least in part. As long as there is indeterminism in the universe to any degree, free will can be true, or so they claim.

    Now, in order for (libertarian) free will to be true, it’s necessary that any of our decisions could have been otherwise. If we rewind the clock, so to speak, to the exact moment at which the decision was made (with the exact same circumstances and with the person having the exact same knowledge), what the libertarian believes is that it’s possible for the person to make a different decision than was originally made. However, this indeterministic view does not allow for free will either. To understand why, let’s go back to our coffee vs. water example.

    Suppose that, in a hypothetical indeterministic universe, you’re deciding whether to have coffee or water with your breakfast. You choose to drink coffee and then go on with your day. Now let’s say that, in this hypothetical scenario, we replay the same decision (with yourself having the same knowledge in the same circumstances) nine more times for a total of ten decisions. Five out of the ten times, you choose coffee, and the other five you choose water. But nothing at all changed between the separate decisions, so how do you explain the fact that your decision itself changed? You can’t — the outcome was entirely random! So then, this doesn’t allow for free will in the usual sense either, because decisions in a hypothetical indeterministic universe would be random, again leaving no room for one’s own volition somehow having an effect on the decision.

    If you’re still having a hard time seeing why this is, consider the following examples:

Suppose an agent decides to steal. If there was a chance, right at the moment of choice, that the agent will instead (at that moment) make a different decision, then there is a possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world up until the time of the decision, but in which the agent makes the alternative decision then. There is, then, nothing about the agent prior to the decision—indeed, there is nothing about the world prior to that time—that accounts for the difference between her making one decision and her making the other. This difference, then, is just a matter of luck. And if the difference between the agent’s making one decision and her instead making another is just a matter of luck, she cannot be responsible for the decision that she makes. (Example taken from here)

Consider Leo. At a certain moment he [causes] a decision to tell the truth, and until he does there remains a chance that he will instead, at that moment, [cause] a decision to lie. There is, then, a possible world that is exactly like the actual world up until the time at which Leo [causes] his decision but in which, at that moment, Leo [causes] a decision to lie. Nothing about the world prior to the moment of the [causing] accounts for the difference between Leo’s causing one decision and his causing the other. This difference, then, is just a matter of luck. And if this difference is just a matter of luck, Leo cannot be responsible for his decision. (Example taken from here)

Consider the conversion of the apostle Paul. All Christians will agree that, as a result of his encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus, Paul became a changed man. Instead of continuing in hard-hearted rebellion against Christ, he became humbly and joyfully submitted to him. But let’s say that Paul’s decision to submit to Christ was “free” in the sense that Arminian Christians believe our choice to believe the gospel is “free.” If that were the case, then it would mean that Paul could have chosen otherwise. That is, in an identical state of affairs and with all things being equal (i.e., with the same exact influences being present and operating on Paul), a different outcome could have resulted.

Think of it this way: if God were to “rewind the tape” of Paul’s life and allow him to choose again, he could’ve made a completely different choice, given the same exact circumstances. But how could such a change in outcome be explained and accounted for? If nothing new enters into the equation immediately prior to Paul’s decision, then this theoretical change in outcomes would be completely arbitrary and random. The only thing that could account for a different outcome taking place would be a purely random event occurring in Paul’s mind. Thus, it follows that, if the choice Paul actually made was “free” in this sense, then it, too, was a completely arbitrary and random event. (Example taken from here)

From these examples, it should be clear why free will is incompatible with indeterminism; this reduces our decisions down to random and arbitrary events, which, although it sidesteps the issue of our decisions being predetermined, still leaves no room for one to have responsibility over one’s own decisions. [2] Instead of being puppets controlled by the strings of fate, we would be puppets jerking this way and that with no rhyme or reason, having as little knowledge as to why we did a certain action as anyone else.

    But if free will is impossible regardless of whether our decisions are caused or uncaused, whether we live in a deterministic or indeterministic universe, then free will is impossible under any circumstances whatsoever. Consider the following logical argument:

1. Our decisions are either caused or uncaused. [3]

2. If caused, our decisions are outside of our own volitional control.

3. If uncaused, our decisions are random and, therefore, outside of our own volitional control.

4. Our decisions are outside of our own volitional control (from 1-3).

5. Libertarian free will requires our decisions to be within our own volitional control.

6. Therefore, Libertarian free will is false (from 4-5).

This demonstrates that it is absolutely impossible for free will to exist.

    Objection: What if one of the causes of our decision is our own volition? This would make it possible for libertarian free will to exist without the problem of randomness. (This is known as the “agent-causation” theory of libertarian free will.)

    Answer: This simply moves the goalposts back, because although there is certainly a conscious aspect to one’s choices, we need to ask where this conscious aspect comes from. Is this conscious aspect caused, an output of previous inputs? If so, then again, one is not truly responsible for that decision. But if it is not caused, then the only non-circular answer that one can give for the existence of this conscious aspect is, “it exists just because.” That is, the existence of such a conscious aspect is random and arbitrary if not caused. [4] Thus, we run into the same problem, that even if there is a conscious, volitional aspect to decision, that aspect itself must be either determined or random — and therefore, it is not truly free will.

    Objection: When we deliberate, we not only weigh the various factors involved, we also weight them. That is, we decide how important different considerations are in relation to one another. These factors do not have a pre-assigned weight that everyone must accept. Part of deliberation is sifting through these factors and deciding how much they matter to us. Therefore, our decisions and actions are still our own responsibility. [5]

    Answer: This is certainly true, but it has the same problem as the other objection. If we “weight” different factors in our mind, why do we decide to weight them the way that we do? Is it because of past experiences that taught us how to weight certain factors? If so, then it’s also determined and incompatible with libertarian free will. But if not, then this must be arbitrary, the result of random occurrences within one’s mind, and outside of one’s own control. Thus, this defense of free will falls victim to the same dichotomy between determinism and randomness, which leaves no room for libertarian free will.

    Objection: Doesn’t compatibilism show that free will is compatible with determinism?

    Answer: Yes, technically it does, but this depends on what you consider the definition of “free will” to be. Compatibilists believe that, although our decisions are predetermined, they are still “free” in the sense that they arise from within the agent and are not compelled by immediate external influences. To take a biblical example, although God caused the pharaoh’s heart to be hardened, which made him continue enslaving the Hebrews (Rom. 9:17-18; cf. Ps. 105:23-25), because the action of enslaving the Hebrews came from a desire within the pharaoh himself, this action would be considered “free” in the compatibilist sense — despite the fact that it was certain to occur.

    Or consider another example: if I decide to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, for the sole reason that I like peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, and I am hungry, this action is “free” in the compatibilist sense. It doesn’t matter if my reasons for liking peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, or for being hungry, are outside of my own control. Even if it was already determined to happen based on past events, this action was free because it arose from a desire within myself. In contrast, if someone had forced me to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, this would not be “free” in the compatibilist sense, because it did not arise from myself. From these examples, it should be obvious that compatibilist free will is not free will in the usual sense. Free will in the usual sense is libertarian free will, which, as I have shown, is impossible.

    Objection: But love requires free will, because it is impossible to force someone to love you. This shows that free will must exist and that God would never force anyone to love him.

    Answer: No, this again ties into the idea of compatibilist vs. libertarian free will. Love requires free will in the compatibilist sense — that is, the desire to love must come from within oneself, regardless of whether it was already predetermined by past events. God, who has perfect knowledge of his creatures, would know exactly how to produce the desire to love within them without needing to force them in a way that is not “free” in the compatibilist sense.

    Indeed, this has happened in the past, according to scripture. Paul wrote that the grace of God overwhelmed him on the road to Damascus, and produced in him faith and love, as a pattern of the method by which all members of the body of Christ believe! (1 Tim. 1:12-16) Thus, it is a blurring of terms to state that love requires “free will,” since usually by this libertarian free will is meant, whereas all that love requires is compatibilist “free” will. God never forces his creatures to love him in a way that is not “free” in the compatibilist sense, but he has produced within them an irresistible desire to love him, and will continue to do so.

    A final word of caution regarding compatibilism

When people refer to “free will”, they almost always mean libertarian free will: the belief that, given any decision, there is the legitimate possibility that one could have chosen otherwise in a way that is neither determined, nor random, nor a mix of the two, but based on one’s own uncaused volitional states. Because it’s logically impossible for anything to be neither determined nor random, neither caused nor uncaused, it is this view of free will that I am claiming is logically impossible.

    Compatibilist free will, on the other hand, is when people choose according to their inner desires, rather than immediate external motivations, such as another person holding a gun to their head — regardless of whether the decision was predetermined. Incompatibilists accept the existence of this form of “free” will, they just deny that it should be considered truly “free” (such that one can assume moral responsibility for one’s actions), since the possibility of having chosen otherwise is not legitimate.

    Unfortunately, the distinction between libertarian and compatibilist forms of “free will” is rarely understood by the average person in the debate surrounding free will, which creates quite a lot of confusion. So whether you believe in (libertarian) free will or not, please make sure not to confuse these terms when discussing or debating its existence.

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[1] This view of free will is confusing to many people, and is not the same as “free will” as it is commonly considered. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval compatibilist, probably explains this theory best: “Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is of the nature of the voluntary [act] that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless, it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle, for it is not of the nature of the voluntary [act] that its intrinsic principle be a first principle.”

In other words, if I choose to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich because of my internal desire to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, I’m exercising compatibilist free will, regardless of whether my decision was predetermined or not. In contrast, if I choose to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich because someone is forcing me to do so at gunpoint, I’m not exercising compatibilist free will.

[2] For a lengthier philosophical explanation of why this “luck objection” is insurmountable for event-causal libertarian free will, see Seth Shabo, “The Two-Stage Luck Objection,” Noûs 54, no. 1 (2020): 3-23.

[3] Based on the simple logical fact that, given any X, everything must be either X or not-X.

[4] For a philosophical explanation of why the “luck objection” is also insurmountable for agent-causal libertarian free will, see pp. 24-45 of Cooper Gordon, “The Luck Objection,” Master’s Thesis, University of Calgary, 2015.

[5] This defense of free will is taken from Jerry Wills’ book Why I Am Not A Calvinist (p. 103).