The Bible and Free Will: The Two Wills of God (part 2 of 5)

Part 1: https://universalistheretic.blogspot.com/2022/09/the-bible-on-free-will-theological.html

     In the first post of this series, we looked at the scriptural evidence for theological determinism, the view that all events which take place (including human choice) are predestined by God. According to the Bible, God “works all things in accordance with the purpose of His will” (Eph. 1:11) and individually fashions “the heart” and “all the deeds” of “all the inhabitants of the earth” (Ps. 33:14-15), as well as “giving to everyone... everything” (Acts 17:25), which necessarily includes thoughts, desires, feelings, etc. Along with many other passages that teach the same thing, these show that humans do not have a true libertarian free will, but choose and act in accordance with the sovereign will of God.

    But how could it be possible that God is in control of all the choices and actions of humans? Wouldn’t this mean that His sovereign will somehow contradicts the commandments that He also gives? This view, that God can command one thing while ordaining the opposite action, has been ridiculed as making God out to be a liar and a hypocrite. However, though it may be confusing, scripture is indeed very clear that God in some way has two ‘wills’ which can conflict and even contradict one another. In this post, we’ll look at the evidence for these two differing ‘wills’ of God, as well as the problems that come along with it.

    The preceptive and providential wills of God

Throughout the Bible, we are repeatedly told of the “will of God.” This phrase is consistently used in two different ways, which, though they are never explicitly differentiated, are nevertheless clearly distinct. The first way in which the “will of God” is spoken of is referring to the precepts or commandments of God - this can be called God’s “preceptive will.” This will comprises the standard which God expects humans to live by, and is summed up in the two commandments, “Love the Lord your God” and “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 22:37-40; Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14; Jas. 2:8). For examples of this ‘will,’ see the following passages:

“Not everyone saying to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will go in to the kingdom of the heavens, but the [one] doing the will of my Father in the heavens.” (Matt. 7:21)

“For whoever may do the will of my Father in the heavens, he is my brother and sister and mother.” (Matt. 12:50)

“We know that God does not hear sinners, but if anyone is God-fearing and does His will, He hears him.” (Jn. 9:31)

And do not be conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewal of the mind, for you to test what is the will of God, the good and acceptable and perfect. (Rom. 12:2)

Do not be foolish, but understand what [is] the will of the Lord. (Eph. 5:17)

For this is the will of God, your sanctification... (1 Thess. 4:3)

In everything give thanks, for this [is] the will of God in Christ Jesus for you. (1 Thess. 5:18)

In each of these passages, the “will of God” is presented as an ideal which is “good and acceptable and perfect,” a standard of precepts (to love God and neighbor) which can be either obeyed or disobeyed. People go against this ‘will’ all the time. Indeed, that is what sin is: a failure to follow the precepts of God (1 Jn. 3:4 cf. 5:17). 

    However, there is another way which the “will of God” is spoken of throughout scripture, as referring to the sovereign or providential will of God which absolutely cannot be violated. If something is part of God’s providential will, it is certain to come to pass. For examples of this ‘will’ being spoken of in the Bible, see the following passages:

But He is unique and who can turn Him back? For what His soul desires [LXX: thelo, “wills”], that He does. For He performs what is appointed for me, and many such decrees are with Him. (Job 23:13-14)

I know that You can do all things, that no purpose of Yours can be withheld from You. (Job 42:2)

[God is] saying, “My counsel shall stand, and I will do all My purpose.” (Isa. 46:10)

For I, Yahweh, speak, and whatever word I speak will come to pass. (Ezek. 12:25)

You will say to me, then, “Why does He still blame? For who has withstood His purpose?” Rather, who are you, O man, contradicting God? Will the formed thing say to the [One] having formed [it], “Why did you make me thus?” (Rom. 9:19-20)

According to all of these passages, the “will” (thelema) or “purpose” (boulema) of God is unable to be thwarted; it is always fulfilled, no matter if the inhabitants of the heavens or the earth try to resist it (Dan. 4:35). This cannot be the same as the first “will of God” described above, which is possible to be thwarted (and indeed is thwarted all the time). Thus, there must be two senses in which God can be said to “will” something: either in a preceptive sense, which can be resisted, or in a providential sense (by which He works “all things;” Eph. 1:11) which cannot be resisted.

    For examples of God’s providential will in action, see the following passages:

For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the gospel of His Son, that I incessantly make mention of you always, imploring in my prayers if somehow, by the will of God, I will prosper to come to you. (Rom. 1:9-10)

Yet I will come soon to you, if the Lord may will... (1 Cor. 4:19)

Yet now, God placed each one of the members in the body as He willed. (1 Cor. 12:18)

...having made known to us the mystery of His will according to His good pleasure, which He predestined in him for [the] administration of the fullness of the seasons, to head up the all things in the Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth, in him, in whom also we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of the [One] working the all things according to the purpose of His will. (Eph. 1:9-11)

Instead you [should] say, “If the Lord may will, we will live and we will do this or that.” (Jas. 4:15)

For [it is] better to suffer doing good, if the will of God might will [it], than doing evil... (1 Pet. 3:17)

You are worthy, our Lord and God, to receive the glory and the honor and the power, because You created all things, and because of Your will they existed and were created. (Rev. 4:11)

This providential will of God, in contrast to the preceptive will of God, can never be thwarted. It controls absolutely everything (Eph. 1:11), from salvation (1 Cor. 12:18) to the success or failure of human plans (Jas. 4:15). Furthermore, unlike the preceptive will of God (which is known from passages like Matt. 22:37-40), the providential will of God cannot be known until it has come to pass, unless God chooses to reveal it in prophecy. Once God has revealed His providential will for the future via prophecy, He makes sure that it comes to pass (for example, see Matt. 26:54; Lk. 24:44; Acts 1:16; 3:18; Rev. 17:16-17).

    When the ‘two wills’ conflict

However, the providential will of God does not always coincide with the preceptive will of God. Indeed, all sin (which is a violation of God’s precepts) is part of God’s sovereign plan. As Peter states in the passage quoted above, even the persecution of believers is ultimately part of the providential will of God (1 Pet. 3:17 cf. Php. 1:29). And although God exhorts “all people everywhere to repent” according to His preceptive will (Acts 17:30), we know that all unbelief is nevertheless appointed by God in His providential will (Rom. 11:32; 1 Pet. 2:8).

    Although some object to this view that God allows, and indeed directly causes, all sin, this is undeniably taught all throughout the Bible. Even in the very first chapters of Genesis, we are told of God’s control over whether one sins:

And God said to [Abimelech] in a dream, “Yes, I know that you did this in the integrity of your heart. I also kept you from sinning against Me, therefore I did not let you touch her.” (Gen. 20:6)

According to this passage, God has the ability to prevent a person from sinning against Him. This means that the inverse is necessarily also true; for an omniscient God such as Yahweh, who is apparently able prevent sin, a failure to prevent someone from sinning would be tantamount to a conscious decision to cause that person to sin. For this reason, any time that anyone sins, it must be in accordance with the providential will of God - otherwise, He would simply prevent that sin from occurring.

    In line with this assessment, there are many times in the Bible where it is made clear that a certain sin was brought about by Yahweh for a specific purpose. This essentially constitutes a contradiction between God’s preceptive and providential ‘wills.’ See the following examples of contradictions between God’s commandments and the events which He has ordained:

“For [the Israelites] are My servants... they shall not be sold as slaves.” (Lev. 25:42)

And he said, “I am your brother Joseph, whom you sold into Egypt. But now do not be grieved or angry with yourselves because you sold me here, for God sent me before you to preserve life... So now it was not you who sent me here, but God... you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good.” (Gen. 45:5, 8, 50:20)

And He summoned a famine in the land; He destroyed all the provision of bread. He sent before them a man, Joseph, who was sold as a slave. (Ps. 105:16-17)

The selling of Joseph into slavery was unequivocally an evil and sinful action, provoked by hate and jealousy against a brother (Gen. 37:4, 8, 11 cf. Matt. 5:21-22). Furthermore, it went against the precept that God later revealed against selling a fellow Israelite into slavery. However, in a turn of events, Joseph later reveals to his brothers that his being sold into slavery was ultimately caused by God, for the purpose of averting the disastrous consequences of a famine. Indeed, according to the Psalmist, both the famine and Joseph’s enslavement were caused by God! This is a clear example of God’s providential will going against His preceptive will.

And Yahweh said to Moses, “Rise early in the morning, and stand before the pharaoh, and say to him, ‘Thus says Yahweh God of the Hebrews, “Let my people go that they may serve Me.”’” (Exod. 9:13)

And the heart of the pharaoh was hardened, and he would not let the sons of Israel go, as Yahweh had commanded by Moses. And Yahweh said to Moses, “Go in to the pharaoh, for I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his servants, that I may show these signs of Mine before him.“ (Exod. 10:1 cf. Rom. 9:17)

We are first told that Yahweh commanded the pharaoh to let the people of Israel leave and serve Him. Yet at the beginning of the very next chapter, Yahweh states that He has hardened the heart of the pharaoh to prevent him from following His commandment. This is another clear contradiction between the providential and preceptive wills of God.

“Honor your father and mother, so that your days may be long in the land that Yahweh your God is giving you.” (Exod. 20:12)

So he said to them, “Why do you do these things? For I hear of all your evil dealings from all these people”... Yet they did not heed the voice of their father, because Yahweh desired to kill them. (1 Sam. 2:23, 25)

In the first passage, God commands the Israelites to honor their parents. Yet in the second passage, we are told that He caused Eli’s sons to ignore their father’s warning, which led to the continuation of their “evil dealings,” precisely because He desired to kill them. This is yet another example of God’s providential will contradicting His preceptive will.

“Do not make marriages with [uncircumcised Canaanites]. You shall not give your daughter to their son, nor take their daughter for your son. For they will turn away your sons from following Me to serve other gods, and the anger of Yahweh will be aroused against you and suddenly destroy you.” (Deut. 7:3-4) 

Yet [Samson’s] father and mother said to him, “Is there no woman among the daughters of your brothers, or among all my people, that you must go and get a wife from the uncircumcised Philistines?” Yet Samson said to his father, “Get her for me, for she pleases me.” But his father and mother did not know that this was from Yahweh, for He was seeking an occasion to move against the Philistines. (Judg. 14:3-4)

In the second passage, we read that God caused Samson to take a wife from among the uncircumcised Philistines, against the better judgment of his parents. However, this clearly goes against the commandment not to marry uncircumcised Canaanites, as well as the injunction to honor one’s father and mother (Exod. 20:12). Thus, this is another instance in which God’s providential will contradicted His preceptive will.

And again the anger of Yahweh was aroused against Israel, and He moved David to say to them, “Go, number Israel and Judah”... And David’s heart condemned him in what he had done. And David said to Yahweh, “I have sinned greatly in what I have done.” (2 Sam. 24:1, 10)

This passage is especially interesting, because not only are we told that Yahweh caused David to commit a “great sin,” but in the parallel passage from 1 Chronicles (21:1), we are told that it was the Adversary (Satan) who caused David to sin! This shows that God is, in some way, the ultimate cause of the Adversary’s evil actions. For other passages that demonstrate God’s sovereign control over the Adversary, and the fact that He uses his evil actions for good, see Job 1:6-11 (cf. vv. 20-22); 2:1-8 (cf. v. 10); Lk. 22:31-32; 1 Cor. 5:5; and 2 Cor. 12:7-9.

“You shall not murder.” (Exod. 20:13)

And  a messenger came to Job and said, “The oxen were plowing and the donkeys feeding beside them, and the Sabeans attacked and took them. They also slew the servants with the edge of the sword, and I alone have escaped to tell you”... While he was still speaking, another also came and said, “The Chaldeans formed three bands and made a raid on the camels and took them and slew the servants with the edge of the sword, and I alone have escaped to tell you”... Then Job arose and tore his robe and shaved his head, and he fell to the ground and worshiped. He said, “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked I shall return there. Yahweh gave and Yahweh has taken away. Blessed be the name of Yahweh.” Through all this Job did not sin nor did he wrongly charge God. (Job 1:14-15, 17, 20-22)

In the second passage, Job attributes the murder of his servants by the Sabeans and Chaldeans to the work of God, and we are told that he did not “wrongly charge God.” Yet the actions of the Sabeans and Chaldeans were without question sinful, going against one of the most basic moral injunctions of the Old Testament, “You shall not murder.” This shows that God is even in control of the death of humans by the instrumentality of other humans (see also 2 Chron. 22:7-9; Isa. 10:5-15).

    Furthermore, earlier in this chapter we are told that it was the Adversary (Satan) who caused these sinful and evil actions for the purpose of trying to make Job curse God (1:9-11; 2:4-7). Yet, Job twice attributes the evil that is afflicting him to God Himself, and both times we are told that Job did not sin nor wrongly charge God (1:20-22; 2:10). This demonstrates that even the evil actions of the Adversary are ultimately caused by God, in His providential will.

“God now commands all mankind everywhere to repent, because He established a day in which He is about to judge the world in righteousness, by a man whom He designated, having provided confidence to all [by] having raised him out of the dead.” (Acts 17:30-31)

For God shut up the all in disobedience, that He may have mercy on the all. (Rom. 11:32)

And they stumble at “a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense,” disobeying the word, to which they were also appointed. (1 Pet. 2:8)

According to the first passage, God commands all people everywhere to repent and turn to Him. Yet elsewhere, we are told that God is the ultimate cause of all disobedience, and appoints certain people to become unbelievers. This is yet another clear contradiction between God’s preceptive will and His providential will.

    Finally, perhaps the most important instance in which God’s providential or sovereign will conflicted with His preceptive will is at the crucifixion of Jesus. One of the commandments in the Law states, “Do not kill the innocent or the righteous, for I will not acquit the guilty“ (Exod. 23:7). Therefore, the death of Jesus, who was the most innocent and righteous man to have ever lived (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 1 Pet. 2:21-22), must have been entirely against the preceptive will of God. Indeed, this evil act is said to have been inspired by the Adversary himself (Lk. 22:3), and the apostles repeatedly exhorted the people of Jerusalem to repent of it (Acts 2:36-38; 3:17-19; 4:10-11; 7:52-53).

    However, though the crucifixion of Christ was certainly against the preceptive will of God, scripture repeatedly states in no uncertain terms that it was also predestined and ordained by God in His preceptive will. See the following passages:

Yet Yahweh delighted [LXX: boulomai, “purposed”] to crush him; He has wounded him. (Isa. 53:10)

Again, having gone away for a second time, [Jesus] prayed, saying, “My Father, if it is not possible for this to pass unless I drink it, Your will be done.” (Matt. 26:42)

“Jesus of Nazareth... given up by lawless hands in the determined purpose and foreknowledge of God, having crucified [him], you put [him] to death.” (Acts 2:22-23)

“For in this city both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with Gentiles and peoples of Israel, were truly gathered together against Your holy servant, Jesus, whom You anointed, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose had predetermined to happen.” (Acts 4:27-28)

According to these passages, the crucifixion was predestined and brought about by the providential will of God, despite being contrary to the revealed, preceptive will of God. Indeed, the death of Jesus was entirely crucial to God's redemptive plan (Jn. 3:14-16; 12:32-33; 1 Cor. 15:3-4; Eph. 1:9-11).

    So... how is God good?

    All of these many, many examples demonstrate that it is possible for the providential will of God to run contrary to His preceptive will. Indeed, if it is true that God "works all things according to the purpose of His will" (Eph. 1:11) and that He fashions "all the deeds" of "all the inhabitants of the earth" (Ps. 33:14-15), then there can be no doubt that all sin is brought about by God's sovereign will. Both good and evil find their ultimate source in God. Although many Christians are uneasy about this idea, it is explicitly taught in several passages:

And I set my heart to seek and search out concerning all that is done under the heavens. It is an evil experience that God has given to the sons of men, to humble them by it. (Ecc. 1:13)

“I am Yahweh, and there is no one else. I form light and create darkness, make peace and create evil; I, Yahweh, do all these things.” (Isa. 45:6-7) 

“Shall we accept good from God and not evil?” In [saying] all this, Job did not sin with his lips. (Job 2:10) 

Who speaks, and it comes to pass, if Yahweh has not commanded it? Does not the evil go out from the mouth of the Most High along with the good? Why should a living man complain about his sins? (Lam. 3:37-39) 

If a trumpet is blown in a city, will not the people be afraid? If there is evil in a city, has not Yahweh caused it? (Amos 3:6)

All these passages clearly teach that God is the ultimate cause of evil actions. Indeed, there is nothing that a person can say or do without God having predestined it (such is the nature of theological determinism). However, this raises a very important question: if God is the source of both good and evil, obedience and disobedience, then how is God good or praiseworthy? And how is it possible for God to repeatedly contradict Himself? And how can humans be considered responsible for their sin, if it is actually God causing them to break the commandments that He Himself made in the first place?

    If you take a look at most of the passages quoted in the above section, you can see that they are written in such a way as to absolve God of all guilt (despite stating that He is the source of the sinful action) while affirming that the humans who committed the sin are guilty, evil, and/or lawless. For example, when God brought about the death of Jesus, it was for the much greater purpose of salvation, while the humans involved killed Him for their own shortsighted, hateful goals. When He hardened the pharaoh's heart, it was to show His glory throughout the earth and mightily save the Israelites, while the pharaoh kept the Israelites out of selfishness. When Yahweh caused Samson to disobey his parents and marry an uncircumcised Philistine, it was for the purpose of bringing down the oppressive Philistines, while Samson did it out of disobedience.

    All of these instances exemplify a rule which, I believe, is best illustrated by the words of Joseph: "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good” (Gen. 50:20). Although the sin of humans is evil because it comes from a place of hatred and jealousy, God's goodness is not compromised when He brings about this sin, because He does it in the best interest of the people involved. Indeed, without the experience of evil, we would be unable to fully understand and appreciate goodness. If we had never fallen into sin, we would never have known God's perfect love and grace.

    Furthermore, although from our limited perspective, it may seem that the preceptive and providential wills of God contradict, this is only because we are unable to see the larger picture. Remember that the preceptive will of God essentially boils down to two commandments: to love God with all your heart, mind, and soul, and to love your neighbor as yourself (Matt. 22:37-40; Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:14; Jas. 2:8). Humans often fail to live up to these precepts by being unloving, which results in sin and evil.

    But when God brings about this sin and evil, He does so out of love (for He loves all people; Matt. 5:43-48), for the greater good, and therefore it does not contradict the central message of His preceptive will. As the author of Lamentations wrote,

The Lord will not cast off forever. For though He causes suffering, yet He will show compassion, according to the greatness of His mercies. For He does not afflict from the heart, nor suffer the sons of men. (3:31-33)

The suffering which God temporarily brings is not “from the heart,” that is, God does not cause us to suffer out of His own morally evil condition, but for the fundamentally good purpose of later showing mercy. According to Paul, the "mystery of His will" by which He "works all things" is to "head up all things in the Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth" (Eph. 1:9-11). We must have faith that every evil which we suffer now will make our experience of eternity that much better [1]. This shows that God can create evil without compromising His own perfect goodness and light.

Part 3: https://universalistheretic.blogspot.com/2022/10/the-bible-and-free-will-open-theism-and.html

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[1] This balancing act between God's sovereignty and goodness only works in a universalist worldview, however. If God fails to save even one person, then the experience of evil is unjustified for that person, and God has failed to truly love that person (since love, although it may punish, ultimately works for the greatest good of the object of love; Heb. 12:5-11). Fortunately, scripture supports the idea that God's providential will works toward the salvation of all, for Paul states that "the mystery of His will" by which He "works all things" is to "head up all things in the Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth" (Eph. 1:9-11).

The Bible and Free Will: Theological Determinism (part 1 of 5)

In my last post, I examined the philosophical question of whether libertarian free will is a logical impossibility. Although it is certainly possible to choose and act in accordance with one’s inner desires, which is the compatibilist view of ‘free will,’ the libertarian view of free will - which is that, given any decision, there is the legitimate possibility of choosing otherwise - is neither compatible with determinism nor indeterminism (due to the “luck problem”) and is therefore impossible. (For a more detailed explanation, see my earlier post “Can free will exist?”)

    However, another question, which is just as important, is what exactly does the Bible teach about the topic of determinism and compatibilist vs. libertarian free will? Does it teach that, given any decision, there is the legitimate possibility that one could have chosen otherwise (libertarian free will), or that although our decisions are made in accord with our inner desires, they are ultimately determined (determinism/compatibilist free will)? And is our salvation also predestined by God? In this series of posts on the topic of determinism and free will in the Bible, we will examine these questions and more.

    Theological Determinism: Is everything predetermined?

Even among those who affirm a belief in monergism (the view that salvation is a unilateral act of God), Christians are divided on whether the sovereignty of God extends to absolutely all events (the view known as “theological determinism”), or whether there is any amount of indeterminism in the universe. But it is my belief that theological determinism is indeed true - that every event is entirely the result of causes which came before it, leading back to the creation of the world, such that all things that take place are ultimately part of God’s sovereign plan. There is nothing in the history of the universe that has taken place apart from the providential will of God.

    There are multiple lines of evidence in scripture which lead to this conclusion. For example, God demonstrates His absolute foreknowledge of the future many times throughout the Bible (e.g., 1 Sam. 23:10-12, Ps. 139:4, Isa. 42:9, Jer. 1:5, Acts 2:23, 1 Pet. 1:2). Yet if God knows every future event, which necessarily includes the choices which humans will make, this means that there is only one possible future - which is exactly the claim made by theological determinism. Furthermore, if the future choices of human beings are perfectly known by God, it is not legitimately possible to choose otherwise than one will choose, and therefore libertarian free will must be false [1].

    Although there are other scripture-based logical arguments that demonstrate theological determinism to be true, this doctrine is also taught directly in scripture. See the following passages:

“Remember the former things long past, for I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is no one like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things which have not been done, saying, ‘My plan will be established, and I will accomplish all My good pleasure.’” (Isa. 46:9-10 NASB)

The statement that “the end” can be known from “the beginning” (or, in a bit of Hebrew synonymous parallelism, that those things which “have not been done” can be known “from ancient times”) might be represented in more philosophical terms as saying that, given perfect knowledge of the initial state, the final state may be known. Yet this is exactly the claim made by determinism. Therefore, this passage actually teaches theological determinism directly. And since libertarian free will definitionally excludes determinism, we may conclude that the Bible does not teach the existence of free will.

    Now, it could be objected that just because that one passage appears to teach determinism over against free will doesn’t mean that the Bible as a whole teaches determinism (although this objection would throw the law of biblical non-contradiction, and thus scriptural infallibility, entirely out the window). However, though Isa. 46:10 is one of the clearest deterministic passages of scripture, there are far, far more passages that teach that determinism is true. For example,

The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from Yahweh. (Prov. 16:33)

This demonstrates that even seemingly random events, like the casting of lots, are predetermined by God. Thus, any indeterminism in the universe is merely apparent; even that, too, is determined by Yahweh.

...in [Christ] also we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of the [One] working the all things according to the purpose of His will. (Eph. 1:11)

In this passage, Paul describes God as “the One working the all things according to the purpose of His will.” If someone were to ask Paul, “What is God working according to the purpose of His will?” Paul could reply, based on this verse, “He is working the all things.” In other words, if God is truly working all things in accordance with His will, then there can be nothing which is not, ultimately, in accordance with His providential will. This teaching of Ephesians 1:11 leads directly to the doctrine of theological determinism.

    Some have objected that the “all things” of this passage could merely be limited to the predestination of believers. However, it would be tautological for Paul to state that “believers are predestined because God predestines believers.” No, the point that Paul is making is far greater; he is saying that we may be confident that our predestination in Christ is secure because God is working all things in accordance with the purpose of His will. Since the scope of God’s will is universal rather than merely limited, our salvation is certain, as is the ultimate “heading-up” of all things in Christ (v. 10).

Come now, the [ones] saying, “Today or tomorrow we will journey into this here city, and will spend a year there, and will trade, and will profit,” who do not know what [is] tomorrow. What [is] your life? For it is a vapor, appearing for a little, and then vanishing. Instead you [should] say, “If the Lord may will, we will live and we will do this or that.” (Jas. 4:13-15)

According to James, both one’s life and the success or failure of one’s future plans are ultimately under the control of God’s providential will. This is only possible if God’s sovereign control extends over the minute details that go into every day, such that one’s plans may either go well or fail.

    Although these are far from the only passages that show God’s sovereign control to extend over absolutely everything, which I will show in the next section, these passages alone (especially Isa. 46:9-10 and Eph. 1:11) still demonstrate the validity of the doctrine of theological determinism. Since God is able to determine the end from the beginning, as He works all things according to the purpose of His will, absolutely all events must be predetermined, which leaves no room for libertarian free will. There is truly nothing that is outside of God’s providential control.

    God’s control over the human will

The above four passages, I believe, show virtually beyond a doubt that God’s providential will does control every event and choice that takes place in this universe. However, this still does not get to the heart of the main question that we asked at the beginning of this post: does the Bible teach that our will is free in the libertarian sense, or that our choices are actually predestined (i.e., by God)? As a matter of fact, scripture teaches very clearly that our will is also subject to God’s providential control. See the following passages which demonstrate the general principle of God’s control over the human will:

From heaven Yahweh looks and sees all the sons of men; from the place of His dwelling He peers and sees all the inhabitants of the earth. He fashions individually their hearts; He establishes all their deeds. (Ps. 33:13-15) 

The plans of the heart are to mankind, yet the answer of the tongue is from Yahweh. (Prov. 16:1)

The heart of a man plans his way, yet Yahweh establishes his steps. (Prov. 16:9)

Many are the plans in the heart of a man, yet the counsel of Yahweh will stand. (Prov. 19:21)

A man’s steps are from Yahweh; how then can a man understand his way? (Prov. 20:24)

Like rivers of water is the heart of a king in the hand of Yahweh; He turns it wherever He wishes. (Prov. 21:1)

“I know, O Yahweh, that the way of a man is not in himself, and it is not in man who walks to establish his own steps.” (Jer. 10:23)

“And all the inhabitants of the earth are accounted as nothing, and He does according to His will among the host of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth; and there is none that can restrain His hand, or say to Him, ‘What have you done?’” (Dan. 4:35)

[God] is not served by hands of mankind, [as though] He is needing anything, Himself giving to everyone life and breath and everything... for in Him we live and move and are. (Acts 17:25, 28)

Note: This passage is especially interesting, because it shows that God gives everything to everyone (cf. Jn. 3:27), which necessarily includes thoughts, desires, feelings, etc. The “everything” that God gives to “everyone” is related to the nothing that anyone can give to Him (cf. Rom. 11:35-36); the reason that no one can give anything to God, even obedience, is because everything (including obedient or disobedient actions) ultimately comes from God in the first place.

So then, He shows mercy to whom He wills, yet whom He wills, He hardens. You will say to me, then, “Why does He still blame? For who has withstood His purpose?” Rather, who are you, O man, contradicting God? Will the formed thing say to the [One] having formed [it], “Why did you make me thus?” (Rom. 9:18-20) 

For God is the [One] working in you, both to will and to work, by [His] good pleasure. (Php. 2:13) 

None of these passages should be difficult to understand; they all state explicitly that the will of man is something that is entirely under God’s control, which God can turn wherever He so wishes. Most notably, the Psalmist writes that God fashions “the hearts” and “all the deeds” of “all the inhabitants of the earth” (Ps. 33:14-15 cf. Dan. 4:35), which can only be true if all of our choices and actions are predetermined by the providential will of God.

    All of the passages quoted above serve to demonstrate the general rule that the human will is under the providential control of God, and to refute the Arminian view that “God does not violate man’s ‘free will.’” But are there any specific examples of God using this power over the human will to directly alter their choices? As a matter of fact, there certainly are. For example:

And Yahweh said to Moses, “Go in to the pharaoh, for I have hardened his heart and the hearts of his servants, that I may show these signs of Mine before him.“ (Exod. 10:1 cf. Rom. 9:17)

“Yet Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass through, for Yahweh your God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate, that He might give him into your hand, as he is this day.“ (Deut. 2:30)

There was not a city that made peace with the sons of Israel, except the Hivite inhabitants of Gibeon. They took them all in battle. For it was of Yahweh to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that He might utterly destroy them, that they might receive no mercy, but that He might destroy them as Yahweh had commanded Moses. (Josh. 11:19-20)

And Israel came into Egypt, and Jacob dwelt in the land of Ham. And [God] increased His people greatly and made them stronger than their foes. He turned their heart to hate His people, to deal craftily with His servants. (Ps. 105:23-25)

What then? What Israel seeks, it has not attained this, yet the chosen attained [it]. Now the rest were hardened, as it has been written: “God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes to not see, and ears to not hear, until this very day.” (Rom. 11:7-8)

For God shut up the all in disobedience, that He may have mercy on the all. (Rom. 11:32)

In each of these instances, God caused a certain person or group of people to be “hardened,” so that they failed to follow His instruction for some purpose. Indeed, this may be generalized to all people who are in unbelief, as Peter described the unbelievers of his day as “disobeying the word, to which they were also appointed” (1 Pet. 2:8). However, just as God is able to harden the hearts of certain individuals in order to carry out His purposes, He is also able to produce true love and obedience within the hearts of others.

“And Yahweh your God will circumcise your heart, and the heart of your descendants, to love Yahweh your God with all your heart and all your soul, that you may live.” (Deut. 30:6)

“And I will give them a heart to know Me, that I am Yahweh, and they will be My people, and I will be their God, for they will return to Me with their whole heart.” (Jer. 24:7)

“And I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within you, and I will remove the heart of stone from your flesh, and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put My spirit within you and cause you to walk in My statutes and My judgments, and you will keep and do [them]... Then you will remember your evil ways and your deeds that were not good, and you will loathe yourselves in your own sight for your iniquities and your abominations.” (Ezek. 36:26-27, 31)

According to these passages, God has the ability to cause one to walk in His statutes and return to Him with their entire heart. This is precisely the sort of change that Arminians argue cannot be effected unilaterally by God. Yet these passages clearly show that a person’s choice to return to God only comes after God changes their heart (cf. Jn. 6:44), rather than the other way around.

    Apart from these examples which show God’s ability to organically produce belief, unbelief, love, hate, obedience, disobedience, and other emotions and mental states within an individual, there are also several instances where we are explicitly told that God caused a person to make a specific choice at a given time, in accordance with the truth that God is able to “turn [the heart of a king] wherever He wills” (Prov. 21:1). See the following passages:

“Shall the ax boast against Him who chops with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against Him who saws with it? That would be as if a rod could wield itself against those who lift it up, or a rod lifting the one who is not wood.” (Isa. 10:15)

Note: In this passage, God is comparing the Assyrian king and army to merely an ax or saw in His hand that He is using to punish Israel with (see vv. 6 - 14). This emphasizes God’s complete and total sovereignty over the actions of the Assyrian king and army; they have no independent action apart from that which God has imparted to them, just as an ax cannot move without a human operating it.

Now in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, that the word of Yahweh by the mouth of Jeremiah might be fulfilled, Yahweh stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia so that he made a decree throughout all his kingdom and put it in writing... (Ezra 1:1)

And they kept the Feast of Unleavened Bread with joy seven days, for Yahweh had made them joyful and had turned the heart of the king of Assyria toward them, to strengthen their hands in the work of the house of God, the God of Israel. (Ezra 6:22)

“Blessed be Yahweh, God of our fathers, who has put such a thing as this in the heart of the king, to beautify the house of God which is in Jerusalem!” (Ezra 7:27)

"And my God put it into my heart to gather the nobles and the rulers and the people, that they might be registered by genealogy." (Neh. 7:5)

And the ten horns that you saw, and the beast, these will hate the prostitute, and will make her having been desolated and naked; and they will eat her flesh, and burn her in fire. For God has put it in their hearts to do His purpose, even to do one purpose, even to give their kingdom to the beast, until the words of God will be fulfilled. (Rev. 17:16-17)

In each of these instances, God puts a specific purpose in the heart of a person or group of people, causing them to make a certain choice and/or do a certain action. Yet this is precisely the sort of control over human actions that Arminians and (philosophical) libertarians believe that God cannot and does not exert.

    So, do humans have free will? The answer depends on what type of free will is meant. In the compatibilist sense, humans do have ‘free will,’ because they are able to choose and act in accordance with their inner desires. However, in the libertarian sense, humans do not have free will, because there is not the legitimate possibility of choosing otherwise. Every choice or action that a person makes is already determined, because, as the Psalmist wrote, God fashions “the heart” (leb, which refers to the will or center of volitional control) and “all the deeds” of “all the inhabitants of the earth” (Ps. 33:15).

    But if God predetermines every choice and action that a person makes, wouldn’t that make God the author of sin? How could God’s sovereign control over the universe contradict His commandments, such that all sin and evil is also part of His plan? In the next posts of this series on the Bible and free will, we will take a look at all of these questions and more.

Part 2: https://universalistheretic.blogspot.com/2022/09/the-bible-and-free-will-two-wills-of.html

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[1] Although it is sometimes argued that God’s perfect foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian free will, since His knowledge is based on what human beings will choose, this goes contrary to the doctrine of divine aseity (that God’s attributes are based in Himself alone, and He does not require any outside influence for them; see Acts 17:25). Since God’s attributes cannot be based on any outside influence, it is impossible for His foreknowledge to be contingent on the libertarian choices of human beings.

Can free will exist?

    Few doctrines in Christianity have been more debated — or more taken for granted — than that of free will. For many Christians, the idea of free will underpins their entire belief system. If there’s no free will, how is it possible for one to freely accept or reject the gospel message? And how can anyone be considered truly morally accountable for their sins if free will doesn’t exist? It wouldn’t be an overstatement to say that without free will, the entire worldview of most Christians would collapse, because they see free will as the only way to explain the supposedly biblical position that many people will, ultimately, never be saved.

    Christians have traditionally understood the interplay between free will and God’s sovereignty in one of two ways. First, most Christians have believed that humans do, indeed, have free will, and yet God somehow also foreknows the future with perfect certainty (despite the fact that these two beliefs are seemingly logically contradictory) — this position is today known as Arminianism. Second, a minority since the Reformation have believed that free will does not exist in the normal sense of the word, but that God is intimately involved in every aspect of reality and human choice (despite the fact that this means that God predestines most people to eternal torment arbitrarily) — this position is known as Calvinism, or Reformed theology. There is also a third position, known as open theism, which argues that humans have free will and God does not know the future, but this position is avoided by most Christians.

    So, which of these views is correct? Does free will even exist, or is it an illusion? I believe that both of these questions boil down to a more fundamental issue: can free will exist? That is, is the libertarian sense of free will in which our decisions are not determined, and are the result of our own volition, logically possible? Because the doctrine of free will is so important in Christianity, and has such a great effect on the debate surrounding universalism, in this post we will explore this question of whether free will can exist in reality.

    Defining our terms

One of the biggest problems in the debate surrounding free will is how the terms are defined. People are extremely prone to confusing the idea of choice, or agency, with the idea of libertarian free will. No one doubts that humans have the ability to choose, of course; we go through conscious and subconscious choices every second. The question is whether the outcomes of our choices are ultimately based on our own volition, or if they’re determined by outside forces. Here are the definitions of each of the terms to be used in this article:

Will/Agency: the ability to decide between two or more options at any given time

Choice: the act of using one’s will or agency to decide between two or more options

Decision: the outcome of a choice

Libertarian Free Will: the idea that our decisions are the result of our own volition and not determined by outside forces

Compatibilist Free Will: the idea that our decisions are determined by outside forces, but are free in the sense that the decision comes from within the agent [1]

From here on, we’ll simply refer to libertarian free will as “free will”, since this is the theory of will which people think of when they refer to free will. Now that we have defined our terms, we can begin examining whether (libertarian) free will is logically possible.

    Are our actions caused or uncaused... or is this even relevant?

Determinists (including compatibilists) see our decisions as something like the roll of a die. To understand this theory of will, it is best to think of our decisions in terms of outputs and inputs. The output of the roll of a die is seemingly random and changeable, but ultimately it is fully the result of certain inputs combined with the laws of physics. Those inputs are themselves outputs resulting from earlier inputs, and so on. Likewise, determinists see decision as completely the result of previous events.

    For example, if I choose at a certain time to drink coffee rather than water, that output is ultimately the result of previous inputs, such as my preference for coffee over water, my hunger level at the time of the decision, the temperature of the room, etc. And each of those are based on even earlier inputs; why was my hunger level what it was at the time? Perhaps because of causes outside of my own control, or perhaps because of another past decision that I made which was, itself, the output of other inputs. But ultimately, what determinists believe is that if the circumstances at the time and all past events were known perfectly, my decision could be predicted with perfect accuracy.

    It should be obvious why this view is incompatible with (libertarian) free will. If our decisions can be predicted with perfect accuracy beforehand, and they are ultimately the result of events outside of our own control, then they can’t be the result of our own volition to any degree. Because of this, those who believe in free will often present the issue as a dichotomy between determinism and free will: if our decisions are not entirely governed by past events, then they can be the result of our own volition, at least in part. As long as there is indeterminism in the universe to any degree, free will can be true, or so they claim.

    Now, in order for (libertarian) free will to be true, it’s necessary that any of our decisions could have been otherwise. If we rewind the clock, so to speak, to the exact moment at which the decision was made (with the exact same circumstances and with the person having the exact same knowledge), what the libertarian believes is that it’s possible for the person to make a different decision than was originally made. However, this indeterministic view does not allow for free will either. To understand why, let’s go back to our coffee vs. water example.

    Suppose that, in a hypothetical indeterministic universe, you’re deciding whether to have coffee or water with your breakfast. You choose to drink coffee and then go on with your day. Now let’s say that, in this hypothetical scenario, we replay the same decision (with yourself having the same knowledge in the same circumstances) nine more times for a total of ten decisions. Five out of the ten times, you choose coffee, and the other five you choose water. But nothing at all changed between the separate decisions, so how do you explain the fact that your decision itself changed? You can’t — the outcome was entirely random! So then, this doesn’t allow for free will in the usual sense either, because decisions in a hypothetical indeterministic universe would be random, again leaving no room for one’s own volition somehow having an effect on the decision.

    If you’re still having a hard time seeing why this is, consider the following examples:

Suppose an agent decides to steal. If there was a chance, right at the moment of choice, that the agent will instead (at that moment) make a different decision, then there is a possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world up until the time of the decision, but in which the agent makes the alternative decision then. There is, then, nothing about the agent prior to the decision—indeed, there is nothing about the world prior to that time—that accounts for the difference between her making one decision and her making the other. This difference, then, is just a matter of luck. And if the difference between the agent’s making one decision and her instead making another is just a matter of luck, she cannot be responsible for the decision that she makes. (Example taken from here)

Consider Leo. At a certain moment he [causes] a decision to tell the truth, and until he does there remains a chance that he will instead, at that moment, [cause] a decision to lie. There is, then, a possible world that is exactly like the actual world up until the time at which Leo [causes] his decision but in which, at that moment, Leo [causes] a decision to lie. Nothing about the world prior to the moment of the [causing] accounts for the difference between Leo’s causing one decision and his causing the other. This difference, then, is just a matter of luck. And if this difference is just a matter of luck, Leo cannot be responsible for his decision. (Example taken from here)

Consider the conversion of the apostle Paul. All Christians will agree that, as a result of his encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus, Paul became a changed man. Instead of continuing in hard-hearted rebellion against Christ, he became humbly and joyfully submitted to him. But let’s say that Paul’s decision to submit to Christ was “free” in the sense that Arminian Christians believe our choice to believe the gospel is “free.” If that were the case, then it would mean that Paul could have chosen otherwise. That is, in an identical state of affairs and with all things being equal (i.e., with the same exact influences being present and operating on Paul), a different outcome could have resulted.

Think of it this way: if God were to “rewind the tape” of Paul’s life and allow him to choose again, he could’ve made a completely different choice, given the same exact circumstances. But how could such a change in outcome be explained and accounted for? If nothing new enters into the equation immediately prior to Paul’s decision, then this theoretical change in outcomes would be completely arbitrary and random. The only thing that could account for a different outcome taking place would be a purely random event occurring in Paul’s mind. Thus, it follows that, if the choice Paul actually made was “free” in this sense, then it, too, was a completely arbitrary and random event. (Example taken from here)

From these examples, it should be clear why free will is incompatible with indeterminism; this reduces our decisions down to random and arbitrary events, which, although it sidesteps the issue of our decisions being predetermined, still leaves no room for one to have responsibility over one’s own decisions. [2] Instead of being puppets controlled by the strings of fate, we would be puppets jerking this way and that with no rhyme or reason, having as little knowledge as to why we did a certain action as anyone else.

    But if free will is impossible regardless of whether our decisions are caused or uncaused, whether we live in a deterministic or indeterministic universe, then free will is impossible under any circumstances whatsoever. Consider the following logical argument:

1. Our decisions are either caused or uncaused. [3]

2. If caused, our decisions are outside of our own volitional control.

3. If uncaused, our decisions are random and, therefore, outside of our own volitional control.

4. Our decisions are outside of our own volitional control (from 1-3).

5. Libertarian free will requires our decisions to be within our own volitional control.

6. Therefore, Libertarian free will is false (from 4-5).

This demonstrates that it is absolutely impossible for free will to exist.

    Objection: What if one of the causes of our decision is our own volition? This would make it possible for libertarian free will to exist without the problem of randomness. (This is known as the “agent-causation” theory of libertarian free will.)

    Answer: This simply moves the goalposts back, because although there is certainly a conscious aspect to one’s choices, we need to ask where this conscious aspect comes from. Is this conscious aspect caused, an output of previous inputs? If so, then again, one is not truly responsible for that decision. But if it is not caused, then the only non-circular answer that one can give for the existence of this conscious aspect is, “it exists just because.” That is, the existence of such a conscious aspect is random and arbitrary if not caused. [4] Thus, we run into the same problem, that even if there is a conscious, volitional aspect to decision, that aspect itself must be either determined or random — and therefore, it is not truly free will.

    Objection: When we deliberate, we not only weigh the various factors involved, we also weight them. That is, we decide how important different considerations are in relation to one another. These factors do not have a pre-assigned weight that everyone must accept. Part of deliberation is sifting through these factors and deciding how much they matter to us. Therefore, our decisions and actions are still our own responsibility. [5]

    Answer: This is certainly true, but it has the same problem as the other objection. If we “weight” different factors in our mind, why do we decide to weight them the way that we do? Is it because of past experiences that taught us how to weight certain factors? If so, then it’s also determined and incompatible with libertarian free will. But if not, then this must be arbitrary, the result of random occurrences within one’s mind, and outside of one’s own control. Thus, this defense of free will falls victim to the same dichotomy between determinism and randomness, which leaves no room for libertarian free will.

    Objection: Doesn’t compatibilism show that free will is compatible with determinism?

    Answer: Yes, technically it does, but this depends on what you consider the definition of “free will” to be. Compatibilists believe that, although our decisions are predetermined, they are still “free” in the sense that they arise from within the agent and are not compelled by immediate external influences. To take a biblical example, although God caused the pharaoh’s heart to be hardened, which made him continue enslaving the Hebrews (Rom. 9:17-18; cf. Ps. 105:23-25), because the action of enslaving the Hebrews came from a desire within the pharaoh himself, this action would be considered “free” in the compatibilist sense — despite the fact that it was certain to occur.

    Or consider another example: if I decide to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, for the sole reason that I like peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, and I am hungry, this action is “free” in the compatibilist sense. It doesn’t matter if my reasons for liking peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, or for being hungry, are outside of my own control. Even if it was already determined to happen based on past events, this action was free because it arose from a desire within myself. In contrast, if someone had forced me to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, this would not be “free” in the compatibilist sense, because it did not arise from myself. From these examples, it should be obvious that compatibilist free will is not free will in the usual sense. Free will in the usual sense is libertarian free will, which, as I have shown, is impossible.

    Objection: But love requires free will, because it is impossible to force someone to love you. This shows that free will must exist and that God would never force anyone to love him.

    Answer: No, this again ties into the idea of compatibilist vs. libertarian free will. Love requires free will in the compatibilist sense — that is, the desire to love must come from within oneself, regardless of whether it was already predetermined by past events. God, who has perfect knowledge of his creatures, would know exactly how to produce the desire to love within them without needing to force them in a way that is not “free” in the compatibilist sense.

    Indeed, this has happened in the past, according to scripture. Paul wrote that the grace of God overwhelmed him on the road to Damascus, and produced in him faith and love, as a pattern of the method by which all members of the body of Christ believe! (1 Tim. 1:12-16) Thus, it is a blurring of terms to state that love requires “free will,” since usually by this libertarian free will is meant, whereas all that love requires is compatibilist “free” will. God never forces his creatures to love him in a way that is not “free” in the compatibilist sense, but he has produced within them an irresistible desire to love him, and will continue to do so.

    A final word of caution regarding compatibilism

When people refer to “free will”, they almost always mean libertarian free will: the belief that, given any decision, there is the legitimate possibility that one could have chosen otherwise in a way that is neither determined, nor random, nor a mix of the two, but based on one’s own uncaused volitional states. Because it’s logically impossible for anything to be neither determined nor random, neither caused nor uncaused, it is this view of free will that I am claiming is logically impossible.

    Compatibilist free will, on the other hand, is when people choose according to their inner desires, rather than immediate external motivations, such as another person holding a gun to their head — regardless of whether the decision was predetermined. Incompatibilists accept the existence of this form of “free” will, they just deny that it should be considered truly “free” (such that one can assume moral responsibility for one’s actions), since the possibility of having chosen otherwise is not legitimate.

    Unfortunately, the distinction between libertarian and compatibilist forms of “free will” is rarely understood by the average person in the debate surrounding free will, which creates quite a lot of confusion. So whether you believe in (libertarian) free will or not, please make sure not to confuse these terms when discussing or debating its existence.

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[1] This view of free will is confusing to many people, and is not the same as “free will” as it is commonly considered. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval compatibilist, probably explains this theory best: “Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is of the nature of the voluntary [act] that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless, it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle, for it is not of the nature of the voluntary [act] that its intrinsic principle be a first principle.”

In other words, if I choose to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich because of my internal desire to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, I’m exercising compatibilist free will, regardless of whether my decision was predetermined or not. In contrast, if I choose to eat a peanut butter and jelly sandwich because someone is forcing me to do so at gunpoint, I’m not exercising compatibilist free will.

[2] For a lengthier philosophical explanation of why this “luck objection” is insurmountable for event-causal libertarian free will, see Seth Shabo, “The Two-Stage Luck Objection,” Noûs 54, no. 1 (2020): 3-23.

[3] Based on the simple logical fact that, given any X, everything must be either X or not-X.

[4] For a philosophical explanation of why the “luck objection” is also insurmountable for agent-causal libertarian free will, see pp. 24-45 of Cooper Gordon, “The Luck Objection,” Master’s Thesis, University of Calgary, 2015.

[5] This defense of free will is taken from Jerry Wills’ book Why I Am Not A Calvinist (p. 103).

Refuting Preterism (part 4 of 4)

Part 3: https://universalistheretic.blogspot.com/2022/08/refuting-preterism-part-3.html

     Daniel’s Seventy ‘Weeks’

One of the most important specific prophecies of the Old Testament is that of Daniel’s seventy ‘weeks’, or more accurately, seventy “sevens”. This prophecy is the framework in which all other prophecies regarding the “tribulation” are to be understood (compare Dan. 9:24-27; 12:7 with Matt. 24:15; Rev. 12:6). Because of this, preterists believe that the second half of the 70th “seven” occurred during the Jewish-Roman War of AD 66 - 70, whereas futurists believe that the entire 70th “seven” is yet future.

    Soon after Cyrus of Persia conquered Babylon, Daniel became aware that the seventy year exile prophesied by Jeremiah was quickly approaching its end (Dan. 9:1-2). Because of this, he began to pray and make supplication to God to allow the Israelite people to return to their land and be restored to their former glory (Dan. 9:3-19). In response to this prayer, a vision was given to Daniel in which he was told that it would be yet seventy times seven years before Israel would again be restored:

“Seventy sevens are determined for your people, for your holy city, to shut up the transgression, and to seal up the sins, and to cover over iniquity, and to bring in age-during righteousness, and to seal up vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Holy of Holies. Now know and comprehend [that] from [the] going forth of a word to return and build Jerusalem till Prince Messiah, [there will be] seven sevens and sixty-two sevens. [It will be] built again, plaza and moat, yet in distressful times.

“And after the sixty-two sevens, Messiah will be cut off, and he has nothing. And the people of the coming prince will destroy the city and the holy [place]. And the end [is] with a flood, and until the end [is] war - desolations are decreed. And he will prevail a covenant with the many for one seven, yet halfway of the seven he will cease sacrifice and offering, and on a wing of abominations [will be] the desolating [one], even till the decreed destruction is poured on the desolating [one].” (Dan. 9:24-27)

Based on a plain reading of this passage, we get the following sequence of events:

1. A word to return and rebuild Jerusalem will go forth.
   
   
2. Sixty-nine “sevens” (i.e. 483 years) transpire from this “word” until Prince Messiah.
   
   
3. After the sixty-nine “sevens” Messiah will be killed and have nothing.
   
   
4. The people of the coming prince will destroy the city and temple.
   
   
5. He - according to the closest antecedent, referring to the “coming prince” whose “people” will destroy the city and temple - will cause a covenant with the many to prevail for one “seven” (i.e. 7 years).
   
   
6. In the middle of the last “seven” he will cease sacrifice and offering, and desolate until the end of the final “seven”, when destruction will be poured out on him.

Regardless of whether Daniel originally understood there to be a gap between the 69th “seven” and the 70th “seven”, we now know that there certainly was. This is because, between the 69th and 70th “sevens”, we are told that (1) the Messiah will be cut off, and (2) the city and temple will be destroyed. Since these did not occur all at the same time, but in AD 30 and AD 70 respectively, there must have been a gap of at least forty years between these two “sevens”.

    Furthermore, because the city and temple is said to be destroyed (which was fulfilled in AD 70) before the beginning of the 70th “seven”, according to the most natural reading of the text, the tribulation period cannot have ended at that time, as preterists believe. And because the events of the 70th “seven” have not yet occurred at any time after AD 70, we may conclude that this “seven”, including the prophecies of the tribulation found in the Olivet discourse and book of Revelation, are still future. The gap between the 69th and 70th “sevens” which began at some point prior to AD 30 must still be ongoing.

    Non-futurists often ridicule the idea that God would have stopped the ‘prophetic clock’ of the seventy sevens for over two thousand years. However, as shown above, this follows directly from a comparison of the prophecy with known historical events. But why would God have stopped this ‘prophetic clock’? The answer may be found at the beginning of the prophecy, in v. 24, where we are told that the prophecy is meant for “Daniel’s people” (i.e. Israel) and “Daniel’s holy city” (i.e. Jerusalem). We know that, at some point, God cast away the majority of Israel as His people until a future time:

The [thing] Israel seeks, this it has not attained, yet the chosen attained [it]. Now the rest were hardened, just as it has been written: “God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes to not see, and ears to not hear, until this very day.” And David says: “Let their table become for a trap, and for a net, and for an offense, and for a recompense to them. Let their eyes be darkened, to not see, and their backs oppressed through all [time]”... For if their loss [is] conciliation of [the] world, what [their] reception, if not life out of [the] dead?...

For I do not will you to be ignorant, brothers, of this mystery (that you may not be wise in yourselves), that a partial hardening has come about to Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles may enter. And so all Israel will be saved, just as it has been written: “The rescuing [one] will come out of Zion, he will turn back impiety from Jacob. And this is the covenant from Me to them, when I may take away their sins.” (Rom. 11:7-10, 15, 25-28)

This “hardening” and “loss” of the majority of Israel occurred near the beginning of the earthly ministry of Jesus (cf. Matt. 13:11-15). Thus, because God is currently not dealing with the vast majority of Israel as His people, the prophetic events associated with “Daniel’s people” and “Daniel’s holy city” have also been put on hold, until a future time when “the fullness of the Gentiles may enter”. This futurist understanding of the seventy “sevens” of Daniel is entirely reasonable, and the only one which is compatible with what we know from history (which is that the events associated with the 70th “seven” have not yet occurred).

    Now, we will take a look at some of the other interpretations of this prophecy and see if they fit the prophesied events as well as the futurist interpretation.

1. The 70th “seven” occurred from AD 27 to 34, the period from Jesus’ baptism to the stoning of Stephen (Acts 7:54-60). During this time, Jesus, as mediator of the New Covenant, caused a covenant to prevail with the many for one “seven”. The abomination of desolation in the middle of the “seven” occurred in AD 30 when Jesus died, which caused the veil of the temple to be torn (Matt. 27:51), thus ending sacrifice and offering.

This is probably the most common non-futurist interpretation of the seventy “sevens” of Daniel, and it is the official doctrine of the Seventh-Day Adventist denomination. Although this interpretation may seem superficially plausible and appealing, as it appears to find direct fulfillment without requiring any gap at all between the 69th and 70th “seven”, it is actually fraught with problems.

    First, this interpretation simply does not agree with the timeline produced by a plain reading of the prophecy. The progression from v. 26 to v. 27 appears to show that the death of the Messiah and the destruction of the city and temple occur prior to the beginning of the 70th “seven”, and yet this interpretation places the death of Messiah in the middle of the 70th “seven”, and places the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70 almost forty years after the end of the 70th “seven”. Furthermore, the one who confirms a covenant for one “seven” in v. 27 should be the “coming prince” whose people destroy the city and temple, according to the closest antecedent of “he”, whereas this interpretation equates the “he” of v. 27 with Jesus, whose people (obviously) did not destroy the city and temple in AD 70.

    Second, having the final “seven” end in AD 34 at the stoning of Stephen is entirely arbitrary and scripturally unsupported. Although the stoning of Stephen was certainly a significant event, nowhere is it said that this event marked God’s final rejection of Israel - instead, the hardening of Israel occurred near the beginning of Jesus’ ministry (Matt. 13:11-15 cf. Rom. 11:7-8). Jesus didn’t cause the New Covenant to prevail for seven years from AD 27 to 34. Rather, He became mediator of the New Covenant with Israel through His death in AD 30 (Heb. 9:16-17; 10:15-22; 12:24), and will continue to mediate until Israel receives their inheritance according to this covenant (Heb. 8:6-13; 9:15).

    Third, the “abomination of desolation” is definitely not associated with the death of Jesus in AD 30. In the Olivet discourse, Jesus associates this abomination with a future time in which Jerusalem will be surrounded by armies, after which there will be great tribulation such as has never been seen before (Matt. 24:15-21 cf. Lk. 21:20-24). Furthermore, it is said that destruction will be poured out at the end of the 70th “seven” upon the one who sets up the abomination of desolation. It should go without saying that Jesus was not destroyed at the stoning of Stephen in AD 34!

2. The first half of the 70th “seven” occurred from AD 27 to 30 and ended at the death of Jesus. The second half of the 70th “seven” occurred from AD 66 to 70 when the Roman commander and crown prince Titus (the “coming prince”), came to Jerusalem and set up the abomination of desolation, beginning the Jewish-Roman War.

This is another common preterist interpretation of Daniel’s 70th “seven”, but it suffers from many of the same problems as the previous one. This has the same issue of not agreeing with the timeline produced by a plain reading of vv. 26 - 27, as rather than placing the death of Messiah and destruction of the city and temple prior to the 70th seven, it places the death of Messiah in AD 30 in the middle of the “seven” and the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70 at the end of the “seven”.

    Furthermore, this suffers from the even greater problem that it requires a gap of nearly forty years in the middle of the 70th “seven”. Although the text allows for a gap between the 69th and 70th “seven”, no such allowance is made within the final “seven”. Even if the final “seven” is a symbolic description of a longer period of time (which there is no indication of in the text), no covenant was caused to prevail between Jesus’ baptism in AD 27 and the destruction of Jerusalem AD 70, either by Titus or Jesus (since the New Covenant began in AD 30 at Jesus’ death and continues indefinitely).

    Finally, this interpretation, like the other preterist interpretation, suffers from an incorrect view of the abomination of desolation. Although the Roman armies did enter and desecrate the temple, this occurred in AD 70, at the end (not the middle) of the 70th “seven” on this view. Furthermore, although this interpretation is more grammatically plausible than the first in that it sees “the desolating one” as the “coming prince” of the previous verse, namely, the Roman commander and crown prince Titus, no “decreed destruction” was poured out upon Titus at the end of the “seven” in AD 70.

    After critically examining the preterist interpretation of Daniel’s prophecy of seventy “sevens”, it should be clear that this passage is absolute proof of futurism over against preterism. Both of the proposed preterist interpretations of this prophecy re-shuffle the order of events prophesied by Daniel, and simply ignore other aspects of the prophecy (such as destruction being poured out upon the desolator at the end of the 70th seven). The futurist interpretation is the only one which makes sense of all these factors and accounts for God’s temporary casting off of Israel (per Romans 11).

    The Early Church on Preterism

To end this series of articles on preterism, I would lastly like to make the point that none of the theologians of the early Christian church held to a belief in preterism. See this article for a survey of the eschatological beliefs of theologians from the first to eighth centuries, which shows that the church at that time was unanimously futurist. Indeed, even long after amillennialism was popularized in the fourth century, there were no early church fathers who believed that the tribulation had already occurred; they all believed that it was a yet-future period of three-and-a-half or seven years during which one man, the Antichrist, would seize power and make war against the saints.

    Although I don’t usually take the beliefs of the early church fathers as evidence for specific doctrinal positions (they were just as capable of bad theology as modern Christians are), the fact is that preterists make a testable claim about the past when they claim that the tribulation occurred in the first century, and this claim is falsified by the fact that even those Christians who lived through the supposed time of the ‘tribulation’ in AD 64 - 70 still saw the biblical tribulation as yet-future. Preterism was only first developed in the seventeenth century by a Jesuit priest, in response to the Reformers’ historicist eschatology which saw the Catholic Church as the “beast” of Revelation. Thus, this view should be abandoned as an unbiblical interpretive framework for prophecy.