The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 3)

    The Second-Century Apologists

    After the so-called ‘Apostolic Fathers,’ most of the surviving Christian writings of the second century come from a group of apologists, including Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenaeus of Lyons, Tertullian of Carthage, and others. These apologists came from mostly philosophical backgrounds, and were strongly influenced by the Platonist worldview of their day, especially in their concept of God. [1] These writers combated many views that they considered to be heresies (e.g., Gnosticism, Docetism, modalism) and in turn strongly influenced the developing ‘proto-orthodox’ Christianity.

    ‘Mathetes’

    The anonymous author of the Epistle to Diognetus, conventionally known as ‘Mathetes’ due to his self-designation as a “student [mathētēs] of the apostles” (Diog. 11.1), has been variously dated between ca. AD 130 and the end of the second century. Mathetes believed that the soul is inherently immortal, in line with the Greek philosophical speculations of his day (Diog. 6.8). However, he also believed that the wicked would be punished by “the real death,” namely, “the aiōnios fire that will punish... until the telos” (10.7). Based on this, Mathetes may have been either an annihilationist or a universalist, depending on whether he believed the telos would involve final destruction or salvation. If he was a universalist, it’s no surprise that he didn’t emphasize this belief, given the pastoral context of the letter.

    Justin Martyr

    Justin Martyr was a former Platonist who converted to Christianity in the mid-2nd century, and was martyred for his beliefs in ca. AD 165. Justin believed that the soul isn’t inherently immortal, but if a soul is pious, it will “never die” (Dialogue with Trypho 5-6). A person will only receive immortality if they petition God and are found worthy of him (1 Apology 10; 13; 21; 39; 42). Upon death, the soul of a person does not go directly to heaven (Dial. 80), but it does go to an intermediate state where it’s either blessed or punished (1 Apol. 18; 20; Dial. 5). The devil and his angels, along with sinners, will “be destroyed... and be no more” (Dial. 45). Yet before this destruction, the wicked will retain sensation aiōnios and be punished for more than a thousand years (1 Apol. 8; 18; 28; 52; Dial. 45).

    Therefore, Justin was an annihilationist who believed that unbelievers would be tortured for a time and then utterly destroyed. He appears to have been the first to hold this view, with the likely exception of 2 Clement (see the previous post); many before him believed that unbelievers would be annihilated, but that they wouldn’t even be resurrected first (i.e., conditionalism). Justin attributes this view, that the wicked would be tortured, to Plato as well as Christ, with the distinction that this torture would be aiōnios rather than one thousand years as Plato taught (1 Apol. 8).

    Tatian of Adiabene

    Tatian was a disciple of Justin Martyr and an apologist, who formed his own church in Assyria after the death of Justin. According to Irenaeus, he was expelled from the ‘proto-orthodox’ church and converted to a type of Gnosticism influenced by Valentinus and Marcion (AH 1.28.1). Tatian appears to have been either an annihilationist or an infernalist, based on his sole surviving writing, the Oration to the Greeks. He states that those who don’t know the truth will be resurrected and “receive death by punishment in immortality” (Or. 13), and that people either “receive immortality with either enjoyment or pain” (Or. 14). The idea of eternal hopeless torture may have first arisen in Gnostic circles, as it also appears in the Gnostic Apocryphon of John (23.40).

    On the other hand, Tatian also says that the soul is inherently mortal, and that it “is dissolved with the body,” but “it dies not” after being resurrected only if it knows the truth (Or. 13). Thus, it’s possible that Tatian was an annihilationist like his teacher Justin, believing that the wicked would be destroyed after painful torture. This is admittedly difficult to square with his statements that the ignorant would receive pain in immortality.

    Theophilus of Antioch

    Theophilus was the bishop of Antioch in the late 2nd century; his sole surviving work, the Apology to Autolycus, was written to convince a pagan friend about Christianity. Theophilus says that whether or not Autolycus believes now, he will see God in the resurrection and then believe (ad Autol. 1.7-8). He warns Autolycus about the aiōnios punishment “in proportion to [your] deeds” that was taught about even by the Greek philosophers (1.14; 2.34-38).

    Yet Theophilus also says that humanity, after discipline for sin, is intended to be restored “after the resurrection and judgment.” Just like a vessel which is broken up and remade, every human is broken up in death “that he may rise in the resurrection whole; I mean spotless, and righteous, and immortal” (ad Autol. 2.26). Immortality is a reward from God (2.27), yet as Theophilus said earlier, Autolycus will be raised immortal whether he believes now or not (1.7-8). He says that the beasts that were created on the sixth day are an allegory for wicked men, and “when man will make his way back to his natural condition, and no longer does evil, these too will be restored to their original gentleness” (2.17).

    Therefore, Theophilus was most likely a universalist. However, this isn’t very explicit in his Apology to Autolycus, because his purpose there is to convince Autolycus to believe now, so that he avoids the aiōnios punishment.

    Melito of Sardis

    Melito was bishop of Sardis in the late second century. In his Apology to Marcus Aurelius, he writes that immortality is a gift given by God to those who serve him and seek after goodness (7.4; 12.5). “At the last time,” everything including humanity will be burnt up by fire, “but the righteous will be preserved from wrath” (18.13-14). Based on these limited data, we can conclude that Melito was probably a conditionalist or annihilationist.

    Irenaeus of Lyon

    Irenaeus was the bishop of Lyon, France toward the end of the second century. Unfortunately, most of his book Against Heresies is preserved only in Latin, and fragments of the original Greek are sparse. The Latin version may not perfectly reflect Irenaeus’ actual views, especially on the duration of punishment, as it translates aiōnios as aeternus (e.g., AH 1.10.1).

    Irenaeus frequently speaks about the punishment of aiōnios fire, or aeternus ignis in the Latin (AH 1.10.1; 2.27.7; 3.4.2; 23.3; 4.27.4; 33.11; 40.1-41.3; 5.26.2-28.4; 35.2). This self-inflicted punishment is “death” and the destitution of all that is good, and it’s “eternal and never-ending” (5.27.2). The soul does continue to exist after death, but those who fail to recognize the God who bestows the gift of immortality deprive themselves of “continuance forever and ever” (2.34.3-4). Immortality and incorruptibility are a gift for those who are adopted as sons of God, and is not received by those who despise the Son of God (3.19.1). There will be a general resurrection (5.35.2), but the “resurrection of the just” to immortality is only for believers (2.29.2; 4.18.5; 5.35.1). Thus, it appears that Irenaeus was an annihilationist.

    On the other hand, Ramelli notes that some of the surviving Greek fragments of Against Heresies point toward universalism. [2] In frag. 4, Irenaeus states, “Christ will come at the telos of the times in order to annul everything evil, and to reconcile again all beings, that there may be an end of all impurities.” God allowed humanity to be swallowed by Satan, like Jonah was swallowed by the whale, but will reconcile humanity to himself via discipline (AH 3.20.1-2). Adam, in whom all of humanity is represented, must be saved; Irenaeus rebukes Tatian for denying this, and quotes Romans 5.12-21 (3.23.2-8). Frag. 12 of book 5 says that those who incline toward evil, and all who die in Adam as “soulish” (i.e., all people) will “live in Christ as spiritual” when their fleshly desires are destroyed. The resurrection of the just will first take place, but after this will take place the general resurrection of people who have been “disciplined beforehand for incorruption” (AH 5.35.2). Irenaeus cites 1 Cor. 15.25-28 to show that at this time, death will be destroyed, all will be subjected to Christ, and God will be “all in all”; there will, however, be gradations of salvation (5.36.1-2).

    In summary, there’s a tension in Irenaeus’ Against Heresies between annihilationism and universalism. It’s possible that some of this tension is due to the mistranslation of aiōnios as aeternus (i.e., “eternal”) in the Latin. If this is the case, Irenaeus was most likely a universalist.

    Athenagoras of Athens

    Athenagoras the Athenian was a philosopher-apologist of the late second century. In his apologetic Plea for the Christians, he refers to punishment from God, but says nothing about its duration (Legat. 31, 36). In his less pastoral treatise on the resurrection, his views are more clear. Athenagoras believed that the soul exists after death of body, but its situation during death is like sleep, with no sensation or awareness of existence (chap. 16-17, 20). The resurrection is a change for the better, for everyone who is in existence at that time (chap. 12). The natural telos of humanity is to be reconciled to God, and this proves the necessity of a future resurrection (chaps. 14-15). 

    Both soul and body must be judged together for their deeds, so there will be punishments after the resurrection (chaps. 20-23). Yet the ultimate telos of every human is the same, to “delight unceasingly in the contemplation of” God — “the great multitude of those who resist this appropriate end does not make void the common lot,” because rewards and punishments are finite and proportioned to the deeds done (chap. 25). Therefore, Athenagoras was a universalist, as he believed that the natural telos of humanity (to be reconciled to God) must ultimately be received by everyone who has that human nature.

    Clement of Alexandria

    Clement was a teacher at the catechetical school of Alexandria, which according to the later historian Philip of Side was founded by Athenagoras, at the end of the second century. Clement is the first early church father who is widely (almost universally) agreed to have been a universalist, as this view is found explicitly across his writings. [3] This is especially the case for his Stromata, which is an intellectual work of systematic theology, as opposed to his apologetic Protrepticus and pastoral Paedagogus.

    Clement warns unbelievers about the aiōnios punishment that awaits them (Prot. 9; Quis Div. Salv. 33). However, in his works written to other Christians, he says that this punishment is intended to restore; indeed, “punishment, by virtue of its being so, is the correction of the soul” (Strom. 1.26; cf. 4.24; 6.6.45-47; 7.16.102; Paed. 1.8). The fire of hell purifies those who pass through it, so that God, “by the perfect judgment, compel[s] egregious sinners to repent” (Strom. 7.2.12; 6.34). The telos of each person’s journey is their apokatastasis, “restoration” (Strom. 2.22.134). Therefore, the Son is truly “the Lord and Savior of all,” because those who don’t now believe in him will eventually confess him (Strom. 7.2).

    Bardaisan of Edessa

    Bardaisan was a prominent Christian theologian in the Middle East at the end of the second century and beginning of the third. According to Eusebius of Caesarea, he was a Valentinian Gnostic at first, but converted to ‘proto-orthodox’ Christianity and wrote polemics against the Gnostics, most notably his dialogue On Fate (EH 4.30.1-3). At the end of this dialogue, Bardaisan concludes that God’s will is unstoppable, but he has allowed each nature to remain in error “for a short time” while preventing them from completely harming each other.

The time will come when the harm that endures in them [i.e., each nature] will be dissipated because of the teaching that will be in another mixture. In the constitution of this new world all rebellions will cease and all strife come to an end. The foolish will be persuaded and defects will be repaired and there will be peace and quiet from the bounty of the Lord of all natures. (Liber 58)

Based on this passage, Ramelli concludes that Bardaisan is an example of universalism prior to Origen. [4] Since Liber Legum Regionem is the only surviving writing by Bardaisan, the most likely conclusion based on the existing data is that he was indeed a universalist.

    Tertullian of Carthage

    Tertullian was an apologist based in Carthage at the beginning of the third century. He was certainly an infernalist who thought that unbelievers would be tortured eternally. In his view, God doesn’t punish in order to restore, but out of anger and vengeance toward sinners (Contra Marcion 1.26-27). According to him, every human will be resurrected (contra conditionalism), and those who did evil will be tortured in fire “without ending and without break,” for “the immeasurable ages of eternity” (Apologeticus 18; 45; 48). Tertullian argued against the annihilationist interpretation of Matthew 10.28 and other passages, claiming that “destruction” is compatible with continual existence in torture (De Res. Carn. 35). Most disturbingly, he says that the greatest and most joyful spectacle will be watching one’s enemies tortured in flames forever (De Spec. 29-30).

    The cause of Tertullian’s infernalism is unclear. He doesn’t seem to think that his view is an innovation, but he betrays a knowledge of annihilationist beliefs and arguments (De Res. Carn. 35). It’s possible that he was influenced by the translation of aiōnios into Latin as aeternus (the latter means “everlasting,” while the former is more ambiguous). However, this seems unlikely, given that he was well-learned in Koine Greek and wrote several books in that language.

    Whatever the reason for his infernalism, Tertullian popularized this view in the Western, Latin-speaking church. Cyprian, a bishop of Carthage in the third century, certainly held to eternal hopeless torture (see Treatises 5.24), as did the fourth-century Latin father Hilary of Poitiers (De Trin. 11.22-29). Annihilationism also remained popular in the Western church, as I will show in the next post.

    Conclusion

    Among the second-century fathers, both annihilationism and universalism were popular. The former view was held by Justin Martyr, Melito of Sardis, and possibly Tatian of Adiabene; the latter view was held by Theophilus of Antioch, probably Irenaeus of Lyon, Athenagoras the Athenian, Clement of Alexandria, and Bardaisan of Edessa. ‘Mathetes,’ the author of the mid-second century Epistle to Diognetus, may have been either an annihilationist or universalist, but either way, he believed that the torture of unbelievers would have an end at the telos. Infernalism, the belief that unbelievers will be tortured eternally and hopelessly, is first attested during this period, possibly in Tatian and certainly in Tertullian of Carthage.

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[1] Thomas E. Gaston, “The Influence of Platonism on the Early Apologists,” The Heythrop Journal 50, no. 4 (2009), 573-580.

[2] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 89-107.

[3] See for example John R. Sachs, “Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology,” Theological Studies 54 (1993): 618-620.

[4] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen, Bardaiṣan, and the Origin of Universal Salvation,” Harvard Theological Review 102, no. 2 (2009): 150-166.

The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 2)

Part 1: The New Testament

    The Apostolic Fathers

    Closest in time to the New Testament texts themselves are the writings of the ‘Apostolic Fathers,’ from the late 1st and early 2nd centuries AD. These include Clement of Rome, Polycarp of Smyrna, and Ignatius of Antioch, along with individual writings such as the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas. Since these writings were the first after the NT (perhaps, in the case of Clement and the Didache, even contemporary with the NT), they’re the best indicator of what the earliest post-apostolic Christians believed about the ultimate fate of unbelievers.

    Didache

    The Didache (“Teaching”) was a manual of faith for early Christians, alleged to have been written by the twelve apostles, which was written most likely some time in the first century. [1] This text has little to say about the ultimate fate of unbelievers. Its distinction between the “way of life” and “way of death” (1.1f; 5.1) may indicate a belief in conditionalism or annihilationism, but on the other hand, there’s nothing to indicate that the “way of death” is final. A better indicator is the Didache’s description of the resurrection: “...the resurrection of the dead, yet not of all, as it is said: ‘The Lord will come, and all his saints with him’” (16.14-16). This suggests that the author was a conditionalist who thought that only believers (“his saints”) would be resurrected.

    Clement of Rome

    Clement of Rome’s beliefs on this topic are difficult to determine, because his only surviving writing is a letter of exhortation to the Corinthian church, recently plagued by the persecution and turmoil of AD 66-70 (1 Clem. 1.1; 5.1-7.1). [1] Clement writes of the continuing sacrifices in the Jerusalem Temple (41.2), but anticipates a quickly coming judgment on the temple (23.3-5; cf. Matt. 24.32), which he wrongly associates with the resurrection of the dead (24.1-3).

    Within this context, Clement often speaks of the judgment of the wicked, to exhort believers not to join them in their coming destruction (14.1-15.6; 22.1-8; 57.1-59.1). However, he also emphasizes that repentance will deliver anyone from God’s judgment (7.4-8.6). Importantly, he states that God is “free from anger... toward all his creatures... doing good to all, but especially we who have taken refuge in his mercies” (19.3-20.11). This indicates that, in his view, God’s punishments are for the ultimate good of all his creatures. Indeed, Clement says later, there is “great protection for those who are chastened by the Master... he chastens us in order to have mercy on us through his holy chastisement” (56.16), which he says specifically about the unbelievers in transgression (56.1-57.2).

    A hint of Clement’s universalism may be found in the doxology at the middle of his letter, where he speaks of “the faith by which Almighty God has justified all men from the ages” (32.4). This may be limited by his statements elsewhere about the number of the elect who have been saved through Jesus Christ (58.2; 59.2). However, we must also consider that Clement is speaking on behalf of the church of Rome, the recipient of Paul’s most universalistic letter, in which he spoke of “justification... for all men” (Rom. 5.18), where “all men” refers to absolutely all people, the same number who were condemned by Adam’s sin (5.12-21).

    Finally, we must take into account the testimony of the later church about Clement’s beliefs. In the 5th-century debate between Rufinus and Jerome, on the topic of universal salvation, Clement the “disciple of the apostle” (i.e., of Rome) was cited as one of the fathers whom both of them agreed was a proponent of universal salvation (Rufinus, Apology Against Jerome 1.43). This testimony, along with the above points, strongly indicates that Clement of Rome was a believer in the ultimate salvation of all. However, he de-emphasized this point in his letter for pastoral reasons, due to his anticipation of the quickly coming judgment.

    Epistle of Barnabas

    The Epistle of Barnabas was an early post-New Testament text, written shortly after the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple (Barn. 16.1-5). [2] This text distinguishes between “the way of light” and “the way of death” (19.1f, 12). The latter is “a way of aiōnios death with punishment” (20.1). The truly eschatological nature of these remarks is confirmed later:

For he who does these things [i.e., righteousness] will be glorified in the kingdom of God, but he who chooses their opposites will perish together with his works. This is why there is resurrection and reward. (21.1)

Therefore, the author of this text believed that the resurrection of the righteous would be accompanied by the final death of the wicked. The Epistle of Barnabas should be classified as either a conditionalist or annihilationist writing (it doesn’t state whether the wicked will be resurrected or not).

    Odes of Solomon

    The Odes of Solomon are a collection of hymns, dating most likely to the late first century. [3] Although the exact relationship is debated, the Odes are very closely related (directly or indirectly) to the gospel and letters of John, and may have been written in or by the same community as those texts. [4] The Odes of Solomon present a very universalistic depiction of salvation. Regarding the Water of Life (cf. GJohn 4.14; Rev. 7.17; 21.6; 22.1, 17), one of the Odes says that nobody could restrain it, and “it went over the face of the whole earth and filled everything. All the thirsty upon earth drank, and their thirst was relieved and quenched, for from the Most High it was given” (Odes 6.9-12). God, through the Son, will take hold of absolutely everything in his salvation; everything that breathes will be given knowledge of the Lord, to sing his praises, at his coming (Odes 7.17-27).

    The scope of the atonement in the Odes of Solomon is universal, just as in John’s gospel and letters (see my previous post). According to the Odes, the Messiah descended to Death and Sheol in order to set everyone free. He says, “I went on to all my prisoners, to liberate them, in order to leave no one bound or binding others... They were gathered to me and were saved, because they became my limbs and I was their head” (17.8-14). Because Death and Sheol could not hold him, they cast him out along with “those who had died,” who were thereby redeemed by him (42.14-26). [5] Throughout the Odes, death is only mentioned in order to describe its defeat via the Messiah’s crucifixion (e.g., 6.14ff; 15.9-11).

    In summary, the Odes of Solomon should be classified as a universalist writing. It represents the scope of the atonement from Jesus’ crucifixion as universal, involving everyone who has died, and says that all people will be given knowledge of the Lord at his coming. However, we must also keep in mind that because it is a hymnal, the Odes may be using hyperbolic language.

    Shepherd of Hermas

    The Shepherd of Hermas was an early Christian text, written in the late first or early second century, which was held in very high esteem by the 2nd-century church. [2] Shep. Herm. takes an extreme view of repentance, claiming that believers have only one chance to repent and won’t be saved if they continue to sin. This book frequently mentions the destruction of the wicked. However, it holds that unbelievers will be allowed to repent “on the last day” when they see God (vis. 2.2.5). Some may be punished for a time, but if they repent, they will be saved; the rest will be utterly destroyed (vis. 3.5.5-7.6; simil. 6.2.1-4). Thus, this work takes a middle position between annihilationism and universalism, as it holds that there will be a second chance at repentance for unbelievers.

    Polycarp of Smyrna

    Polycarp was a bishop of Smyrna in the early second century AD. His single surviving letter, written to the Philippian church, displays a conditionalist view of the ultimate fate of unbelievers. According to him, we will only be resurrected by God “if we do his will, and walk in his commandments, and love what he loved, keeping ourselves from all unrighteousness” (Phil. 2.2f). The Martyrdom of Polycarp, written after his death, says about the martyrs,

...they despised worldly tortures, purchasing aiōnios life by a single hour. The fire of their torturers was cold to them, for they set before their eyes an escape from the [fire] which is aiōnios and not quenched. (Mart. Pol. 2.3)

This could be an indication of nascent infernalism (the view that unbelievers will be tortured forever). It may also simply be echoing Matthean language about Gehenna, which for Matthew would be a place of destruction, not everlasting torture (Matt. 3.12; 10.28; 18.8f). Furthermore, Mart. Pol. may not reflect Polycarp’s actual views about this issue. Therefore, Polycarp would best be categorized as a conditionalist.

    Ignatius of Antioch

    Ignatius was a bishop of Antioch who was martyred some time in the early-to-mid second century. I’ll be treating the middle recension of his seven-letter corpus as original, in line with the current consensus. It’s debated whether these letters were actually written by Ignatius in the early-to-mid 2nd century, or if they were written pseudonymously in the mid-to-late 2nd century. [6] This doesn’t particularly matter for our purposes, because whether or not they are authentically Ignatian, they still reflect the beliefs of one strand of 2nd-century Christianity.

    In some places, the Ignatian corpus seems to support universalism, as Ramelli notes. [7] For example, “when [Christ’s] flesh was lifted up... he attracted all human beings to himself, for their eternal salvation” (Smyrn. 2). [7] Furthermore, he speaks of the destruction of all wickedness and ignorance, so that “all things have been set in motion for the realization of the destruction of death” (Eph. 19). Ignatius urges all people, even rebellious angels, to be saved (Smyrn. 6.1; Polycarp 1.1), showing that he didn’t believe in a limited number of elect individuals (as in modern-day Calvinism).

    On the other hand, Ignatius distinguishes between the teloi of life and death (Magn. 5), and says that the prize of believers is immortality (Polycarp 2). Believers “escape from death by believing in [Christ’s] death” (Tral. 2). This may indicate that the author of the Ignatian corpus was a conditionalist. Therefore, due to the ambiguities in his letters, we can’t be sure whether Ignatius was a universalist or conditionalist.

    Additional apocryphal writings

    Finally, there are several apocryphal Christian writings from the second century which demonstrate an early belief in universalism. The Apocalypse of Peter was a writing which, according to the Muratorian Canon, was believed to be canonical by some 2nd-century Christians. This text graphically describes the punishments of the damned, and says that repentance is no longer available to them (chap. 13). However, according to the most ancient fragment of Apoc. Pet. (the Rainer Fragment), this punishment isn’t hopeless because the elect will intercede for them and stop their suffering. The same idea is found in contemporary apocryphal texts like the Sibylline Oracles (2.330-338) and the Epistle of the Apostles. [8]

    Peter wishes mercy on the damned, and although Jesus doesn’t grant this request, he replies that God has even more compassion than him (chap. 3). The Ethiopic version of Apoc. Pet. concludes that God will have mercy on all sinners, but this truth must not be revealed to unbelievers, lest they sin more. [9] This concern was shared by later universalists like Origen (Contra Celsum 6.26). Although it’s contrary to the earlier universalism of the Pauline corpus, which exhorts to “instruct and teach” that God is the savior of all (1 Tim. 4.10f), this elitist attitude is significant for our purposes, as it shows that later writers may not teach (or even contradict) universalism in their pastoral writings, while still privately believing it.

    The view of Apoc. Pet. is echoed in other apocryphal writings. For example, the Acts of Paul (Thecla 28-29) assume that intercession for the damned is possible, and Jesus “saved all flesh” (3 Cor. 16-18). The Apocalypse of Paul 22-24 declares that the wicked may repent, be baptized, and enter New Jerusalem if the righteous intercede for them. Ramelli argues that universal salvation is at least hinted in the Testimony of the Twelve Patriarchs, and is taught explicitly in the Acts of Thomas and Acts of Philip. [10] Finally, the Gospel of Nicodemus from the 4th century proclaims that absolutely everyone who died and was held captive by Satan via Adam’s sin was freed by Jesus’ crucifixion (chaps. 20-24). It appears that universalism was very popular in the early Christian circles that produced apocryphal literature.

    Conclusion

    The writings of the ‘Apostolic Fathers’ exhibit an inconsistency in their belief about the ultimate fate of unbelievers. Some texts appear to be clearly universalist (Clement of Rome, Odes of Solomon, some apocryphal writings), while others are clearly conditionalist (Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, Polycarp of Smyrna), and some waver between the two or take a middle position (Shepherd of Hermas, Ignatius of Antioch). This inconsistency among the Apostolic Fathers likely reflects the ambiguity within the New Testament itself, in which some authors seem to be conditionalists and others (especially Paul) are universalists. The two other schools of thought, annihilationism and infernalism, are not clearly represented in the writings of any of the ‘Apostolic Fathers’. [11]

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[1] Jonathan Bernier, Rethinking the Dates of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2022), 239-260.

[2] Jonathan Bernier, Rethinking the Dates of the New Testament, 261-276.

[3] Michael Lattke, “Dating the Odes of Solomon,” Antichthon 27 (1993), 45-59.

[4] J. H. Charlesworth and R. A. Culpepper, “The Odes of Solomon and the Gospel of John,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 35, no. 3 (1973), 298-322; J. H. Charlesworth, Critical Reflections on the Odes of Solomon (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 232-259; Jacob J. Prahlow, “Odes and John: Perspectives on Relationship,” Pursuing Veritas (blog), 17 December 2019, https://pursuingveritas.com/2019/12/17/odes-and-john-perspectives-on-relationship/.

[5] Ramelli uses these texts to argue that early Christians believed in the salvation of the damned via Christ’s descensus ad inferos (“descent into hell”): Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 74-75.

[6] Jonathan Lookadoo, “The Date and Authenticity of the Ignatian Letters: An Outline of Recent Discussions,” Currents in Biblical Research 19, no. 1 (2020): 88-114.

[7] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 62-63.

[8] Richard Bauckham, The Fate of the Dead: Studies on the Jewish & Christian Apocalypses (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 144-148, 232-235.

[9] M. R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 520.

[10] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 77-87.

[11] However, annihilationism (destruction after torture) appears in the pseudonymous 2 Clement, which says that the damned will be tortured without possibility of repentance (6.7f; 7.4-8.3; 17.5-7) and they will not receive immortality (14.4f).

The Restoration of All: Universalism in Early Christianity (part 1)

    When I started this blog, my first few posts were about the development of beliefs about the ultimate fate of unbelievers in the first few centuries of Christianity. I concluded that the earliest views were annihilationism and universalism, that the latter was most popular, and that infernalism (eternal hopeless torture) was a later development. Back then, I hadn’t read many of the church fathers and was relying mostly on Ilaria Ramelli’s The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis. Although my conclusions are mostly the same as they were back then, I’ve read a lot more patristic literature, so I’d like to overhaul that series of blog posts with an updated version. In this post, we’ll start with the New Testament to see what the earliest Christians believed about the ultimate fate of unbelievers.

    Defining our terms

    Before we get into our discussion of universalism in early Christianity, let’s define our terms. In this series, we will be categorizing the beliefs of early Christian writers between four schools of thought on the punishment of unbelievers:

• Universalism — the belief that all people will ultimately be saved
• Conditionalism — the belief that only believers will be resurrected
• Annihilationism — the belief that unbelievers will be annihilated forever
• Infernalism — the belief that unbelievers will be tortured forever

There is a fine distinction between conditionalism and annihilationism. The former holds that unbelievers will not even be resurrected; the latter holds that unbelievers will be resurrected, and perhaps tortured for a time, but ultimately annihilated forever. While these terms are used synonymously by many modern annihilationists, some in the early church held that only believers would be resurrected at all (as we will see), so we will use “conditionalism” to refer to this belief.

    Another important distinction is between the Greek words aiōnios and aidios. While the latter word is used to refer to things that are truly eternal (without end), the former does not, even though it’s often translated as “eternal” or “everlasting.” According to Ramelli and Konstan, within the writings of the New Testament and early church, aiōnios means properly “belonging to the [Messianic] Age,” in line with its etymology (from the word aiōn, meaning “age”). [1] As I have shown elsewhere, aiōnios and its cognates are frequently used in the LXX to describe things which, even from the perspective of the original author, were known to be non-everlasting; there, it would be best translated as “perpetual.” [2] Thus, whether an author uses aiōnios to describe the punishment of unbelievers should have little effect on how we interpret their eschatology.

    The New Testament

    The New Testament, defined as the twenty-seven canonical books from Matthew to Revelation, is the primary set of texts that was used by early Christians to define their doctrinal beliefs. Therefore, any study of the beliefs of the early church must begin with the NT itself, which shows us what the apostles and the very earliest believers (within one or two generations of Jesus’ death) understood about the punishment of unbelievers. For the dates of the NT texts, we’ll be provisionally using the dates determined by Jonathan Bernier in his recent monograph. [3]

    The Synoptic Gospels

    In the debate over the ultimate fate of unbelievers, the passages about Gehenna from the synoptic gospels are often appealed to (Matt. 5.22, 29f; 10.28; 18.8f; 23.33; Mk. 9.43-48; Lk. 12.5), along with several passages from Matthew’s gospel about a fiery, aiōnios punishment at “the end of the age” (13.36-43, 47-50; 24.3; 25.31-46). However, as I have argued elsewhere, these passages are actually using imagery from the Hebrew Bible to depict the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, which was associated (at least by Matthew’s gospel) with the end of the then-present age and beginning of the Messianic Age (Matt. 24.1-3; cf. Mk. 13.1-4; Lk. 21.5-7). [4] The passages which speak of a limited salvation during the Messianic Age (Matt. 7.13-14; Lk. 13.23-30) most likely shouldn’t be taken to refer to the ultimate eschaton, either.

    The only passage in the synoptic gospels which talks about the scope of salvation at the eschaton is Jesus’ defense of the resurrection against the Sadducees in Luke’s gospel. There, he talks about “those who are considered worthy to attain to that age, and the resurrection from the dead... children of God” (20.35f), in contrast to “the children of this age” (20.34). This seems to express a belief in conditionalism, that only some will be resurrected. However, Luke-Acts also represents Paul as speaking of “a hope... a resurrection of both the righteous and the unrighteous” (Ac. 24.15). It’s quite possible that Luke-Acts considered every human being “worthy to attain to... the resurrection” by virtue of the fact that “we are [God’s] offspring” (Ac. 17.28f; cf. Lk. 20.35f).

    Finally, the last passage from the synoptics to consider is Matthew 17.11, which in connection with the eschaton states, “Elijah is indeed coming and will restore all things.” Ramelli argues that the original reading of this verse was passive (i.e., “all things will be restored [by God]”) and refers to the salvation of all beings. [5] However, this reading is very tenuous, as panta (“all”) more likely refers to impersonal things than rational beings. [6] Furthermore, this is most likely a reference to Malachi 3:23 (LXX), which also uses the verb apokatastēsei (“will restore”) in connection with Elijah’s eschatological ministry.

    In summary, there are few passages from the synoptic gospels which could be taken to refer to the ultimate fate of unbelievers. Mark’s belief about this topic is uncertain; Matthew’s gospel is also unclear, but there is a very slight chance it could be universalist (17.11); and the Luke-Acts corpus appears in one place to be conditionalist (Lk. 20.34-36), but could also be universalist (Ac. 17.28f; 24.15).

    Peter

    Peter was considered one of the pillars of the Jewish Christian church (Matt. 16.17-19; Gal. 2.7-9), and while it’s possible that we have no authentic writings from him, we at least have writings that claim to be from him or his tradition (several speeches in Acts, 1 and 2 Peter). In one of the speeches of the Lukan Peter, he associates Jesus’ return from heaven with “the times of restoration of all things” (Acts 3.19-21). Ramelli argues that this refers to the salvation of all beings, showing that it was interpreted in this way by many early church fathers. [7] Once again, however, “all” (pantōn) is neuter, implying that it refers to impersonal things rather than rational beings.

    If Peter was a universalist, it isn’t strongly expressed in the two letters that claim to be from him. This is most likely for pastoral reasons, as the author(s) of both letters anticipated a soon judgment and coming of the Lord (1 Pet. 4.5-7, 12-18; 2 Pet. 2; 3.3-13). Leithart argues convincingly that the event in view is the judgment-coming of the Son of Man against Jerusalem (AD 70), which in the synoptic gospels was associated with both the Transfiguration and the death of the first generation of apostles (Matt. 16.27-17.8; Lk. 9.26-36; cf. 2 Pet. 1.16-19; 3.3f). [8] If true, this would support a pre-70 date for 2 Peter, and perhaps even authentic Petrine authorship. Although the focus in 1 and 2 Peter is on judgment, Peter emphasizes that God desires every person to repent (2 Pet. 3.9).

    In summary, Peter’s views on the ultimate fate of unbelievers are uncertain. If Acts 3.21 does refer to the salvation of all beings, and it’s an authentically Petrine statement, then Peter was a universalist. On the other hand, given the emphasis on the destruction of the wicked in 1 and 2 Peter, if they are authentically Petrine, then Peter may have been a conditionalist or annihilationist. The ambiguity here precludes a strong judgment one way or the other.

    John

    Apart from Paul, the most writings in the New Testament are associated with one or more people named “John” (the Gospel of John [GJohn], 1, 2, and 3 John, Revelation). For our purposes, I’ll be treating these texts as written by a single author or community. John the disciple was considered a pillar of the Jewish Christian church alongside Peter (Gal. 2.7-9), if these texts were written by him.

    John displays a more clearly universalist sentiment than the synoptics or Peter. The Johannine Christ states, “If I am lifted up from the earth [i.e., crucified], I will drag all people to myself” (GJohn 12.32; cf. 6.44). He came not to judge the world, but to save it, and “the world” (ho kosmos) includes those who currently reject his message (GJohn 3.17; 4.42; 12.47-49; 1 John 4.14; but cf. GJohn 5.30; 9.39). Jesus is “the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not only ours, but for the whole world” (1 John 2.2). The resurrection on “the last day” is for those whom God has given to Jesus (GJohn 6.39f, 44), and “all flesh” has been given to him, so that he may give them all aiōnios life (17.2).

    John does speak of the judgment of unbelievers, and says that they shall not receive aiōnios life, but he represents this as a presently occurring judgment (GJohn 3.18-21, 36; 5.24; 1 John 2.8-11; 3.14). This judgment is “darkness” and “death” because they have not come to the Light and Life who is Jesus Christ (GJohn 1.4-14; 8.12; 11.25f; 1 John 1.1f, 5-7; 5.11-13). In the Johannine corpus, aiōnios life is always had in the present tense (GJohn 3.15f, 36; 5.24, 39; 6.40, 47, 54; 1 John 3.15; 5.13; cf. gJohn 10.28; 1 John 5.11). Even though judgment is presently occurring, repentance is possible for anyone who wishes to pass from darkness to light and death to life (GJohn 5.24; 8.12; 1 John 3.14). In Revelation, repentance remains possible after the judgment symbolized by the “lake of fire” (Rev. 21.24-26; 22.2, 14), and the “rulers of the land” who were previously destroyed are later seen entering New Jerusalem (19.19-21; 21.24).

    On the other hand, future judgment is referenced in the Johannine corpus. John distinguishes between a “resurrection of life” and a “resurrection of condemnation,” which indicates that some are destroyed after being resurrected (GJohn 5.28f). In Revelation, regarding the Beast-worshipers, “the smoke of their torture goes up for ages of ages, and they have no rest day and night” (Rev. 14.9-11). This language may appear to describe eternal hopeless torture, but the same language is used at Rev. 19.3 to describe the total destruction of Babylon (cf. Rev. 18.10, 17, 19-24). John also speaks of a “second death” which is symbolized by a “lake of fire” (Rev. 20.11-15; 21.8) [9] If these passages refer literally to a still-future punishment, they indicate that John was an annihilationist. However, I’ve argued elsewhere that these passages refer to the fall of Jerusalem in AD 70. [4]

    In summary, John’s views are more clearly universalist than the other authors surveyed above. Across the Johannine corpus, the scope of Jesus’ atonement is said to include “all people” (GJohn 12.32) and “the whole world” (1 John 2.2), including those who now reject him. The judgment of unbelievers is presently occurring, but repentance is available to anyone, even after the “lake of fire” (Rev. 21-22). However, none of these passages explicitly anticipate the salvation of all people; this remains, at most, implicit in the text. Furthermore, if GJohn 5.28f; Rev. 14.9-11; 20.11-15 are taken to literally describe a future judgment, then John may have been an annihilationist.

    Paul

    Unlike other NT authors, Paul clearly believed in the ultimate salvation of all people. This belief shines through in his letter to the Romans. He writes that Jesus’ act of obedience “leads to justification of life for all people” (Rom. 5.18), where “all people” (pantas anthrōpous) refers to absolutely everyone, the same number who were condemned by Adam’s sin (5.12-21). At Jesus’ return, both “the totality [plērōma] of the gentiles” and “all Israel” will be saved, thus God will “show mercy to everyone” who was previously disobedient (11.25-32). The ultimate salvation of everyone doesn’t preclude the judgment of unbelievers (14.10-12). “For the wages of sin is death,” and “death” is the opposite of aiōnios life, which is “glory and honor and peace” (1.18ff; 2.5-12; 3.5-8; 6.21-23; 8.6, 12f)

    Paul’s view of universal salvation is further explained in 1 Corinthians. He presents the resurrection “in Christ” of all people as the consequence of Jesus’ own resurrection (1 Cor. 15.20-22). At the telos, every enemy will be subjected to Christ, death itself will be destroyed, and the Son will be subjected to God, “so that God may be all in all” (15.24-28). That this subjugation is salvific is confirmed by Phil. 3.21, where Paul says that the power by which the Lord resurrects us is “the power by which he also subjects all things to himself.” The end of death and sin will coincide with our resurrection (1 Cor. 15.51-57).

    The other undisputed Pauline epistles display the same belief. Christ “died for all,” and in him God has reconciled the kosmos to himself, thus giving us (who are in Christ) the ministry of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5.14-20). Every person “in heaven and on earth and under the earth” will bow and confess that “Jesus Christ is Lord” (Phil. 2.9-11; cf. Isa. 45.22f), a confession which can only be made in the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12.3) and saves the confessor (Rom. 10.8-10). The telos of some enemies is destruction, but they are still subject to Christ’s salvific subjugation (Phil. 3.19-21). Because of Jesus’ death, “whether we are alert or drowsing [katheudōmen] we will live together with him” (1 Thess. 5.4-10). This ultimate fate doesn’t preclude the temporal judgment and punishment of unbelievers, which is mentioned throughout the undisputed epistles.

    The (possibly deutero-Pauline) letters to Ephesus and Colossae are likewise universalist. In the former, we’re told that the mystery of God’s will is “to gather up all things in Christ, both in heaven and on earth” (Eph. 1.9f). God “reconciled all things to himself... whether on earth or in heaven” by Jesus’ blood that was shed on the cross (Col. 1.16-20). 2 Thess. 1.9 anticipates the aiōnios destruction of the Thessalonians’ persecutors, but aiōnios doesn’t necessarily indicate a hopeless punishment without end (see above).

    Finally, let’s consider the Pastoral Epistles (1 and 2 Timothy, Titus), which claim to be from Paul or at least his tradition. 1 Timothy emphasizes that God “wills all people to be saved,” and Christ Jesus “gave himself as a ransom for all,” so that God is therefore “the savior of all people, especially those who believe” (2.4-6; 4.10f). [10] “For the grace of God has appeared, bringing salvation to all people,” but especially us, the “unique people,” who are being trained in the present time to live righteously (Tit. 2.11-14).

    In summary, a belief in the ultimate salvation of all people pervades the entire Pauline corpus, both the undisputed and disputed letters as well as the Pastoral Epistles. In Paul’s view, this doesn’t preclude the judgment and punishment of unbelievers. Instead, Paul, even moreso than John, focuses on the temporal consequences of sin in the present time (Rom. 1.18ff; 3.5-8; 5.12-14; 6.16, 21-23; 7.5, 13; 8.6, 12f; 1 Cor. 6.9f; Gal. 5.16-21; Eph. 5.5f; Col. 3.5f; 1 Thess. 2.16; 5.3). This punishment is by no means hopeless, because we ourselves were once subject to it! (Rom. 6.13; 7.5; 1 Cor. 6.11; Eph. 2.1-5; 5.8; Col. 3.7) Punishment is ultimately intended to be restorative (1 Cor. 3.11-15; 5.5).

    Conclusion

    The views of the New Testament writers about the ultimate fate of unbelievers are not all clear. Some writers don’t really grapple with this issue at all (Mark, Matthew); others may be either conditionalist or universalist (Luke, Peter); John may be a universalist, but never explicitly says that all people will be saved, or an annihilationist; and Paul is clearly a universalist. Insofar as the NT presents a coherent picture of the ultimate fate of unbelievers, it’s that they will eventually be saved. On the other hand, it might be more accurate to say that there is no ultimate fate for unbelievers, because on Paul’s view, everyone will ultimately be a believer (Phil. 2.9-11; cf. 1 Cor. 12.3). As a proxy for the views of the earliest Jesus-followers, the NT indicates that early Christians were either undecided on the ultimate fate of unbelievers, had no clear belief about it, or were universalists.

Part 2: The Post-Apostolic Fathers

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[1] Ilaria Ramelli and David Konstan, Terms for Eternity: Aiônios and Aïdios in Classical and Christian Texts, (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2013).

[2] See my series of blog posts on this topic, “Just how long is ‘eternal’? A study on the meanings of Αιων and Αιωνιος.”

[3] Jonathan Bernier, Rethinking the Dates of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2022).

[4] See my blog post, “Punishment and Salvation: The Fall of Jerusalem”; see also N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (London: SPCK), 182-185, 320-368.

[5] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 11-13.

[6] Niels Arne Pedersen, “Ilaria Ramelli’s History of the ‘Apokatastasis Doctrine’: A Critical Assessment of Evidence from before Origen,” JTS 20 (2024): 3.

[7] Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 13-20.

[8] Peter J. Leithart, The Promise of His Appearing: An Exposition of Second Peter (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2004).

[9] The “second death” was a term used in the Palestinian Targums to refer to the ultimate destruction of the wicked, from which there would be no return; see Harry Sysling, Tehiyyat ha-Metim: The Resurrection of the Dead in the Palestinian Targums of the Pentateuch and Parallel Traditions in Classical Rabbinic Literature (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 210-228.

[10] Note that “especially” (malista) carries a sense of specialness, but not exclusivity. See how this term is used elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim. 5.8, 17; 2 Tim. 4.13; Tit. 1.10) and the undisputed Pauline corpus (Gal. 6.10; Phil. 4.22; Philem. 16), notably in Galatians 6:10, which is extremely similar to 1 Timothy 4:10 in construction and meaning.

The Incoherence of the Incarnation

    In an earlier post on this blog, I argued that the doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately incoherent; all of the existing interpretations of this doctrine are contradictory, so it has no determinate meaning. But what about the doctrine of the Incarnation — that Jesus is both fully human and fully divine? This doctrine was developed throughout the 5th century AD, and centers around the claim that Jesus has two natures (physeis), a human one and a divine one. Many unitarians argue that the Incarnation, like the Trinity, is contradictory and incoherent. Is that right?

    The incoherence of Christ’s two natures

According to ‘orthodox’ Christology, the single person Jesus is both fully divine and fully human at the same time. On its face, this seems to imply multiple contradictions, because fully divine persons have certain attributes (such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence) that are incompatible with the limited attributes of fully human persons. This was recognized in the early church; for example, the Council of Nicaea II in 787 declared, “the one and same Christ [is] both invisible and visible lord, incomprehensible and comprehensible, unlimited and limited, incapable and capable of suffering, inexpressible and expressible in writing.” Thus, every orthodox theologian must affirm at least five apparent contradictions:

1. The one and same Christ is both invisible and visible.
2. The one and same Christ is both incomprehensible and comprehensible.
3. The one and same Christ is both unlimited and limited.
4. The one and same Christ is both incapable and capable of suffering.
5. The one and same Christ is both inexpressible and expressible in writing.

Is this as contradictory as it appears? It’s tempting for unitarians like myself to just stop here and claim that the Incarnation is incoherent, but that would be intellectually lazy. When reading a text, it’s generally considered charitable to avoid attributing contradiction to the author(s) at all costs, so we should see if there’s any way to make these claims internally consistent.

    Historically, this apparent contradiction has been explained by the idea that Jesus has two natures (Gk: physeis), a fully divine nature and a human nature. His divine attributes are held qua his divine nature, and his human attributes are held qua his human nature. This is how Christ’s attributes are explained, for example, in the Tome of Leo, a fifth-century document written by Pope Leo I, which was affirmed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 as the correct basis of the two-natures doctrine. Leo’s Tome says that it was Jesus’ human nature which wept, hung on the cross, was pierced, and said, “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28), while his divine nature resurrected Lazarus, turned day into night, opened the gates of paradise, and said, “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30).

    What exactly is a “nature” (physis)? This has been understood in one of two ways: either as an abstract set of attributes held by a thing, or as a concrete thing which exists by itself. If the abstract interpretation of “nature” is correct, then to say that Jesus has a fully divine nature and a fully human nature simply means that he, as a person, has a full set of divine attributes and a full set of human attributes. This clearly doesn’t solve the contradiction between divine and human attributes, it just restates it in different terms.

    For this reason, the concrete interpretation of “nature” has been used more by orthodox theologians. This can be seen in the Tome of Leo itself; only a concrete, existing thing can weep, hang on a cross, raise the dead, and speak. Timothy Pawl has defended orthodox Christology along this very line of reasoning — the apparent contradiction between “unchangeable” and “changeable,” for example, can be reconciled if the term “unchangeable” is interpreted to mean “has a concrete nature that is unchangeable” (and the same for “changeable”). [1] Christ, as the only person with two concrete natures, can therefore have two conflicting attributes that would only be contradictory if applied to a person with only one concrete nature.

    However, a problem with this account arises if we consider other attributes. God is necessarily omniscient, and the man Jesus did not know all things (cf. Mark 13:32; Luke 2:40; John 8:40); God can’t be tempted, and Jesus was tempted in every way like us (cf. Matt. 4:1-11; Heb. 2:18; 4:15; Jas. 1:13). Knowledge and temptation aren’t had by impersonal concrete natures, but by persons (what would it mean for an impersonal nature to “know” or be “tempted” by something?). If both of Jesus’ natures have such attributes, it seems that Jesus is two persons, which is the ‘heresy’ of Nestorianism, incompatible with ‘orthodox’ Christology. Pawl argues that Jesus’ human nature would have been limited in knowledge and temptable if it were a separate person, which resolves the problem. [2] However, this fails to grapple with the Scriptural data, which say that Jesus was really unaware of certain facts and was really tempted like us (Mark 13:32; Heb. 2:18; 4:15).

    In summary, the idea that Christ (a single person) has two natures, because of which he can have inconsistent attributes without contradiction, appears to be incoherent. If we interpret “nature” as an abstract set of attributes, then it does nothing to resolve the apparent contradictions. On the other hand, if we interpret “nature” as a concrete, existing thing with its own attributes, then it seems that we have two persons in Christ, because the two natures differ in knowledge and temptability (attributes that are held by persons rather than impersonal natures).

    The incoherence of Christ’s consciousness

We’ve now seen how the idea of “two natures” in Christ leads to incoherence. However, this isn’t the only problem with ‘orthodox’ Christology. If we consider how Christ experiences the world, the Christology of the creeds appears to affirm an inconsistent triad. In logic, an inconsistent tetrad is a set of four propositions that lead to a logical contradiction if taken together; therefore, one or more of the propositions must be denied. The inconsistent tetrad implied by the Incarnation is:

1. God is necessarily omnipresent and omniscient.
2. Jesus is only one person (i.e., has one first-person perspective).
3. Jesus has a human first-person perspective.
4. Jesus is God (i.e., has a nature that is divine in the same way as the Father).

First, let’s see why all these propositions are inconsistent. To briefly define our terms, a “first-person perspective” is a way that an entity experiences the world, and a “person” is something that has a first-person perspective. The way that a human experiences the world is through one’s senses (some combination of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste) mediated through one’s body. Based on all our experience, it appears that the human first-person perspective is necessarily limited; although it’s plausible that God could allow someone to have an ‘out-of-body experience’ where they perceive things outside of the range of their body (e.g., 2 Cor. 12:1-4), such OBEs are still seen from a single point of view. If, for the sake of argument, every human has a soul that can exist apart from their body (contra Genesis 2:7), the human first-person perspective is still a single, limited POV.

    In contrast, God, because he is necessarily omnipresent and omniscient (according to Claim 1), experiences everything in the universe all at once. The divine first-person perspective, therefore, is incompatible with the human first-person perspective; the former has an infinite and unlimited POV, whereas the latter has a single, limited POV. One person (i.e., an entity with a single first-person perspective) cannot have both a divine and human first-person perspective. Therefore, if Jesus was one person (Claim 2), he cannot have a human first-person perspective (Claim 3) in addition to a fully divine first-person perspective (Claim 4). The tetrad of claims is inconsistent; logically, all four cannot be true at the same time, because they entail a contradiction.

    How can Incarnation Christology get around this inconsistent tetrad? Anyone who adheres to orthodox Christology must deny one or more of these claims for their position to be logically coherent. Claim 1 can’t be denied by any monotheist, because it follows from the fact that the God of monotheism is the ground of all being who sustains all existence. Nothing can live or exist apart from him, as confirmed in the Scriptures (e.g., Job 12:7-10; 34:13-15; Ps. 104:29-30; Acts 17:25-28), and assumed by all the early church theologians. Because nothing can exist apart from God, he must exist where anything else exists (omnipresence), and must have maximal knowledge about everything (omniscience).

    Claim 2 could be denied by an orthodox theologian, though not without some difficulty. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 explicitly affirmed that Jesus is only one person and not two persons (“our Lord Jesus Christ... [is] one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son”). There’s some ambiguity here, as the later Council of Constantinople III in 681 declared that Jesus has two wills (divine and human), the latter of which perfectly submits to the former. This could be taken to mean that Jesus has two centers of consciousness, as argued by Richard Swinburne and Thomas Morris. However, this view is only consistent with the creeds in a “restricted” form, where Jesus has one stream of consciousness, one first-person perspective, shared by two minds (a modified affirmation of Claim 2). [3] The fact that Jesus is only one person (i.e., has one first-person perspective) should also be self-evident from the Scriptures, which consistently portray Jesus as a single person with singular pronouns.

    Claim 3 has been denied by some orthodox theologians, such as Athanasius, who claimed that Jesus’ consciousness was fully omnipresent and omniscient even while “existing in a human body, to which he himself gives life” (On the Incarnation 17). But it’s not clear how this can be distinguished from Docetism, the belief that Jesus merely appeared to be a man, which was explicitly denied by the authors of the New Testament (e.g., John 1:14; 8:40; Rom. 5:15-19; 1 Cor. 15:20-22, 45-49; 1 Tim. 2:5; 1 John 4:2; 2 John 7; Heb. 2:6-9, 14-17). If Jesus was omnipresent and omniscient, not experiencing the world through his body but merely puppeteering that body, then in what sense did he “become man,” as the creeds require every orthodox theologian to affirm? And if that is “becoming man,” how did God not “become man” when he previously manifested in a human body (e.g., in Exodus 24:9-11)? Furthermore, the 381 Council of Constantinople and 431 Council of Ephesus affirmed that Jesus’ human nature includes a “human rational soul,” against the Apollinarians who claimed otherwise.

    Finally, as should be obvious, no ‘orthodox’ theologian can deny Claim 4. The claim that Jesus has a fully divine nature, to the same extent as the Father is divine, is implied by the trinitarian interpretation of homoousios (“same essence”) that was asserted about Jesus and the Father at the 381 Council of Constantinople and every ecumenical council afterward. Unlike the claim that Jesus is a man (Claim 3), this claim is not made anywhere in the Scriptures; at most, this claim is barely implicit in the Bible, and was only decided after three hundred years of debate in the proto-orthodox church. [4]

    Thus, it’s difficult, if not impossible, to deny any of the claims of the inconsistent tetrad and remain within the bounds of ‘orthodoxy.’ The only claims that could potentially be denied are Claim 2 and Claim 3. The denial of the former is nearly or fully Nestorian, as it means that Jesus had two first-person perspectives (which implies that he/they was/were two persons). [5] The denial of the latter is nearly or fully Docetic and/or Apollinarian, as it means that Jesus was merely puppeteering his body, without adding anything to God’s first-person perspective, like in the theophanies of the Old Testament (e.g., Exodus 24:9-11). [6]

    But what if the tetrad of claims isn’t inconsistent after all? Some orthodox theologians insist that Jesus had one (human) first-person perspective, and his divine ‘mind’ was merely in his subconscious, although his (human) conscious mind may or may not have been able to access it at will. [7] This might seem to resolve the inconsistent tetrad, but in reality it amounts to a denial of either Claim 1 or 4. As the ground of all being, God actively sustains the existence of all things (Acts 17:25-28); he’s not merely potentially omnipresent and omniscient (which would be a denial of Claim 1), but actually so. The orthodox theologian may object that the Father continues to sustain all things while Jesus is incarnated as human; however, this means that Jesus is not fully divine in the same way as the Father (denial of Claim 4). The tetrad of claims continues to be inconsistent. In order to affirm Claims 1, 3, and 4, it must be said that Jesus actively has two streams of consciousness, which amounts to a denial of Claim 2 (that Jesus is one person).

    The incoherence of Christ’s death

We’ve already seen that orthodox Christology implies a contradiction about Christ’s consciousness. Jesus, who is one person, cannot have both a fully human and fully divine first-person perspective, as the two are incompatible. In fact, another set of inconsistent claims about Christ is implied by orthodox Christology, this time about his death:

1. God cannot die.
2. Jesus died.
3. Jesus is God.

This is simple enough, but let’s define our terms just to make sure there’s no equivocation. By “God,” I mean any person with a nature that is fully divine to the same extent as the Father. No such person can die (Claim 1), and Jesus is such a person (Claim 3). By “Jesus,” I mean the composite person made up of an unmixed fully divine and human nature (according to ‘orthodox’ Christology). That person died (Claim 2), and that person has a fully divine nature (Claim 3). By “die,” I mean the cessation of normal life functions. [8] This cannot happen to a person with a fully divine nature (Claim 1), and it did happen to Jesus (Claim 2). Now that we’ve confirmed this triad of claims has no equivocation, it’s easy to see how it implies a contradiction — Jesus cannot die (from Claims 1 and 3), yet Jesus did die (Claim 2).

    Claim 1 shouldn’t be denied by any monotheist, because it follows from the belief that God is the ground of all being who sustains all existence. This view of God is confirmed throughout the Scriptures (e.g., Job 12:7-10; 34:13-15; Ps. 104:29-30; Acts 17:25-28). God can’t cease to exist, nor can his normal life functions (i.e., sustaining all things, having all knowledge, being all-powerful) cease, because then everything else would stop existing. God’s experience of omnipresence and omniscience didn’t change, even for the three days that Christ was dead, because everything continued to exist — if God’s experience doesn’t change, this can’t be called “death” without making the term utterly meaningless. Finally, the claim that God cannot die is explicitly stated in the Bible (e.g., Job 9:32; 10:5; 33:12; 34:14-15; Ps. 90:2; 102:25-27; 1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16; Rev. 1:4, 8; 4:8).

    Claim 2 can’t be denied by any Christian, because the belief that “Christ died for our sins” is essential to the gospel (1 Cor. 15:3). It would be pointless to cite every time the New Testament says that Christ died for us, because that message is found all across its pages.

    Most orthodox theologians will attempt to get around Claim 1 or 2 by appealing to the idea that the one person, Christ, has both a fully divine and a fully human nature. It’s said that he died according to his human nature, while his divine nature remained essentially immortal. For example, Cyril of Alexandria wrote to Nestorius,

...by nature the Word of God is of itself immortal and incorruptible and life and life-giving, but since on the other hand his own body by God’s grace, as the apostle says, tasted death for all, the Word is said to have suffered death for us, not as if he himself had experienced death as far as his own nature was concerned (it would be sheer lunacy to say or to think that), but because, as I have just said, his flesh tasted death.

Likewise, the Tome of Leo, affirmed at the 451 Council of Chalcedon, states:

To pay off the debt of our state, invulnerable nature was united to a nature that could suffer; so that in a way that corresponded to the remedies we needed, one and the same mediator between God and humanity the man Christ Jesus, could both on the one hand die and on the other be incapable of death.

Once again, this runs into the problem of what it means to say that two contradictory attributes can be held qua two different natures.

    If the two natures are understood as abstract sets of attributes that are held by a single person, then this simply mean that Jesus (as divine) could not die and (as human) died, which is an obvious contradiction. If the two natures are understood as concrete things, one of which could not die and one of which died, it seems that we have two persons here, because “death” is something that happens to a person, not an impersonal nature. If they are understood as two different types of attributes, such that Jesus ‘human-died’ but did not ‘divine-die,’ what does this mean? Does it just mean that his bodily functions ceased, while his conscious experience (omnipresent and omniscient) remained exactly the same? If so, this can’t be understood as “death” without making the term meaningless. This latter view is hard to distinguish from Docetism, as it means that Jesus was only ‘human’ insofar as he puppeteered a human body.

    Finally, what if we deny Claim 3, that Jesus has a nature that is fully divine to the same extent as the Father? Ironically, this is the only one of the three claims that can’t be denied by any orthodox theologian (because it’s explicitly affirmed by the creeds), as well as the only claim that isn’t explicitly affirmed in the Scriptures (at best, it’s an inference which took three hundred years to discover). The orthodox theologian is therefore faced with a trilemma. They must either affirm the creeds and deny Claim 1 and/or 2 (which are explicitly affirmed by the Scriptures), affirm Claims 1 and 2 in agreement with the Scriptures and deny the creeds, or show how the triad of claims is somehow consistent (which so far has proved fruitless).

    The mysterian objection

What if, as some orthodox theologians do, we simply say that the Incarnation is a mystery that can’t be understood by humans? Of course, there are some things that we can never understand about God, because his ways are far above ours (Isa. 40:28; 55:8-9; Rom. 11:33-36; 1 Cor. 2:11). This is much different than the claim that our faith may include true contradictions. Most people will agree that contradictions, by definition, cannot be true, and with good reason: we know from classical logic that a contradiction, if true, would entail the truth of every single proposition (known as the “principle of explosion”). [9] Even if it were possible for God to create a contradiction, such as a square circle or a married bachelor, this would break reality in a way that we know from experience has never happened.

    For this reason, mysterian theologians typically shy away from the claim that the Incarnation implies a true contradiction. (For a mysterian account which does argue that the Incarnation is truly contradictory, and that contradictions can be both true and false, by applying a non-classical system of logic, see Jc Beall’s The Contradictory Christ.) Instead, they argue that even though the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation haven’t yet been interpreted in a way that’s non-contradictory, there may be a non-contradictory interpretation out there that we simply don’t yet (or can’t) understand. [10] Therefore, unitarians and other detractors of these doctrines aren’t justified in claiming that they’re contradictory.

    However, as I argued in my article on the incoherence of the Trinity, this approach ends up destroying the very doctrine that it seeks to save. If the doctrine of the Incarnation can’t be understood by anyone, then those who affirm it are merely repeating a shibboleth that has no determinable meaning, just because the church says that they must, and ‘heretics’ like unitarians are shut out just for the crime of failing to believe a meaningless statement! We can’t even know whether this doctrine is taught in the Scriptures, because we don’t know what it means! Thus, the measure of true faith becomes one’s willingness to blindly follow authority and repeat a statement that is utterly void of determinate meaning. I have a hard time believing that God expects this of us.

    Conclusion

The doctrine of the Incarnation, as described in the ecumenical councils of ‘orthodox’ Christianity, is incoherent in several ways. First, it explicitly attributes at least five pairs of contradictory attributes to Christ, and tries to reconcile this via the idea of Christ’s ‘two natures.’ However, if we interpret each nature as an abstract set of properties, it fails to resolve the contradiction, and if we interpret them as concrete things instead, it implies that there are two persons in Christ. Second, it also implies a contradiction about Christ’s consciousness, by requiring us to affirm an inconsistent tetrad of claims about how Jesus experiences the world. Finally, it also requires us to affirm the inconsistent triad that (1) God cannot die, (2) Jesus died, and (3) Jesus is God.

    Rather than accepting an incoherent and meaningless doctrine solely on the basis of church authority, it would be better for Protestants, if not also Catholics and Eastern Orthodox, to return to the Scriptures and see if it really requires us to affirm this doctrine. Fortunately, it doesn’t. The New Testament never explicitly says that Christ has a nature that is fully divine to the same extent as the Father — this view took centuries for the early church to develop after the NT was written. On the contrary, it presents Jesus as “a man attested by God” who was “made Lord and Messiah” (Acts 2:22, 36); the perfect, sinless, human Lamb who was exalted to become Lord of the universe because of his obedience to his God. [11]

______________________________

[1] Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay (Oxford: OUP, 2016); note that although Pawl’s account isn’t strictly contradictory, I believe he is (unintentionally) changing the subject, as the councils state that it’s “the one and same Christ” who has these attributes, rather than one or another of his concrete natures.

[2] Dale Tuggy, interview with Timothy Pawl, Dr. Timothy Pawl’s In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology – Part 2, Trinities, podcast audio, 14 October 2019, 22:10.

[3] Tim Bayne, “The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects,” Religious Studies 37 (2001): 125-141.

[4] For the history of development of Christian theology in the 1st through 4th centuries, see my blog post series about “The evolution of early Christian theology.” See also R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd., 1988) for a great scholarly treatment of how trinitarianism emerged from the theological upheavals of the 4th century AD.

[5] Nestorianism is the belief that Jesus is two persons, which was officially condemned by the catholic church at the 451 Council of Chalcedon.

[6] Docetism is the belief that Jesus merely appeared to be human, which was condemned by the creedal declaration that Jesus “became man.” Apollinarianism is the belief that Jesus was merely a divine soul within a human body, completely replacing the human soul, which was condemned by the catholic church at the 381 Council of Constantinople.

[7] For an explanation and defense of this view, see Andrew Loke, “The Incarnation and Jesus’ Apparent Limitation in Knowledge,” New Blackfriars 94 (2013), 583-602.

[8] Although I believe that death is the cessation of existence, this is supposed to be an inconsistent triad implied by ‘orthodox’ theology, and ‘orthodox’ theology believes that the soul continues to exist after death. On the other hand, everyone agrees that death is the cessation of normal life functions, otherwise death is literally meaningless.

[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

[10] Dale Tuggy, “Trinity [4.1],” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 20 November 2020, accessed 5 May 2024, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/#NegMys.

[11] To see what the Scriptures actually teach about the nature of God and Jesus, see my blog post, “The Biblical Case for Unitarianism.”